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I. INTRODUCTION

The permanent fund dividend (“PFD”)1 comes once a year in the
form of a check or direct deposit from the state of Alaska, usually in
October, to residents who eagerly anticipate the windfall and likely have
been planning for months on how to spend it: on a vacation, winter fuel, or
some new recreational item.2 Some local snow machine businesses
affectionately refer to the days just after the pay-out as “Early Christmas.”3
And advertising geared toward PFD-recipients has become “an annual ritual
at businesses around Alaska, as residents look for ways to spend their share
of the state’s oil royalties.”4 Since its inception in 1982, the payout has
averaged about $1,000 per person.5 In 2008, the PFD reached its apex, with
the state of Alaska giving each eligible resident $2,069.6 In the days after
that historic payment, one reporter, watching “sports fans . . . wheeling bigscreen TVs out of Best Buy” and “wads of cash” changing hands at
registers, noted everyone “seemed jovial, kind of like [they] just won a
game show prize.”7 One Alaskan economist points out that, greeted as it is
each year with hype and a media barrage, the PFD has “the aura of being
special income.”8

1
The PFD is an annual payment from the State of Alaska to a resident of Alaska, which was
originally financed by the 1969 state auction of leases on Alaska’s North Slope to oil companies, the
proceeds of which have been reinvested and protected by statute and Alaska’s constitution so that they
make it into the hands of Alaskans year after year. Stephen E. Branchflower, The Alaska Office of
Victims’ Rights: A Model for America, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 259, 283–84 (2004); see also discussion infra
notes 18–21.
2
See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.055(a)(1-2) (2012) (mandating that the State Department of Revenue
“pay the dividends by December 31.”).
3
Jeff Richardson, Fairbanks merchants soak up Alaska Permanent Fund cash, FAIRBANKS DAILY
NEWS-MINER (Oct. 11, 2009, 11:58 PM), http://newsminer.com/view/full_story/3958225/articleFairbanks-merchants-soak-up-Alaska-Permanent-Fund-cash?.
4
Id.
5
See Permanent Fund Dividend Div. 2011 Annual Report, STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE,
PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND DIV. 1, 30 (2011), http://pfd.alaska.gov/Content/AnnualReports
/2011AnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter 2011 ANNUAL REPORT].
6
Id. In 2008, the Alaska legislature also passed an energy rebate, which tacked another $1,200
onto that year’s PFD. See Wesley Loy, Legislature passes $1,200 rebate, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS
(Aug. 7, 2008), http://www.adn.com/article/20080807/legislature-passes-1200-rebate.
7
Julia O’Malley, Alaskans waste no time spending PFD, rebate, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Sept.
12, 2008), http://www.adn.com/2008/09/12/524040/alaskans-waste-no-time-spending.html#storylink=
misearch.
8
Scott Goldsmith, The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend: An Experiment in Wealth Distribution,
BASIC INCOME EUR. NETWORK 9TH INT’L CONG 1, 16 (2002), http://ilo.org/public/english/protection
/ses/download/docs/gold.pdf.
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As a newcomer to Alaska in 2004, I too grew accustomed to
anticipating my PFD. As the birch and aspen-blanketed hills encircling
Fairbanks turned lemon yellow, as the crisp wind began to insinuate
darkness and snow, and as the smell of fallen cranberries stung the air, I
would think of the PFD as a sort of paid vacation that made up for the slow
hours at the end of the summer construction season and corresponding
daytrips to fish for fiercely hungry grayling or trout in their soon-to-be icy
waters. Positioned as it is, the PFD payout seems like Alaska’s way of
enticing you to stay through the winter and its week-long cold snaps of forty
below zero, high heating bills, and bleak days that are truncated into only
five hours of weak, low-slanted sunlight. It seems only fair that, if one
drives to work on thudding tires frozen flat overnight by the cold, walks
outside, inhales, and feels a quick freezing moving up one’s nostrils, then
one should be compensated by whatever cockamamie, obstinate government
decided to bestow its sovereignty on such a god-forsaken place. So is the
PFD just a state kickback for Alaska’s frigid winters? You certainly are not
entitled to one if you leave the state because your physician recommended
“climatic change” would do you good.9
How can it be that “[e]ligibilty for PFDs includes meeting a
definition of residency tied to physical contact to the state, which may be
more difficult to meet than the definition of residency for other
purposes[?]”10 Something else, then, must be at work, some continual
reevaluation by the Alaskan body politic of what it means to be Alaskan, an
idea that we must take stock of ourselves every spring,11 after the winter
questioned our allegiance to our state, and awake from the hibernating
darkness to check the right box on a form: “Yes, I’ve made it – I haven’t
eloped for too long to warmer, sunnier climes – and I would like to be
compensated soon too, please.” So it may be true that, at least in Alaska,
“political citizenship ‘runs with the land.’”12 The PFD, as sheer cash and as
a token of political belonging, has such symbolic force in Alaska that one oil
company, facing a lawsuit in Alaska that could have increased PFD
amounts, claimed to the Ninth Circuit “that the financial interest of every
Alaskan judge or juror in the outcome of the pending state proceedings
supports a ruling that, as a matter of law, Alaska cannot provide an unbiased
tribunal.”13 Criminal defendants attacking the composition of the juries
9

ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(a)(5) (2014). An allowable absence may include “receiving
continuous medical treatment recommended by a licensed physician or convalescing as recommended . .
. if the treatment or convalescence is not based on a need for climatic change.” Id.
10
Brodigan v. Alaska Dep’t of Revenue, 900 P.2d 728, 733 n.12 (Alaska 1995).
11
See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.011(a) (2007) (“An application for a permanent fund dividend shall be
filed during the period that begins January 1 and ends March 31 of that dividend year.”).
12
Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., Comment, The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend and Membership in
the State’s Political Community, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 79, 81 (2012).
13
Standard Alaska Prod. Co. v. Schaible, 874 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1989). The argument was
dismissed without prejudice on procedural grounds. Id. at 630.
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selected to judge them argue that jurors chosen from a list of PFD recipients
rather than a list of the state’s voters would be more equitable.14 And
researchers focusing on the program’s inception have even correlated the
receipt of a PFD to a fourteen-gram increase in the birth weight of newborn
Alaskans,15 which in turn suggests increased health at birth.16
This Comment will examine how challenges to the allocation of
PFDs have rarely met with success. Section II will sketch a brief history of
the PFD: how its first incarnation fared poorly against an equal protection
challenge in the United States Supreme Court, how the PFD program
changed because of that decision, and finally, how the PFD program is
currently justified constitutionally by the Alaska Supreme Court. Section III
will delve through formal administrative hearings to show that, despite the
seminal Zobel ruling,17 Alaska’s administrative law judges continually cull
permanent residents from the brink of PFD ineligibility while denying PFDs
to most newcomers to the state. Section III will also suggest three
interrelated solutions geared toward ridding the PFD eligibility inquiry of its
reliance on an applicant’s past Alaskan residency or lack thereof. In
addition to Section III’s solutions, Section IV will make the case that,
although the PFD program does serve legitimate state interests, those
interests are not the ones articulated by the courts. The current justifications
for the PFD program do not closely align with how it is administered. The
PFD would rest on surer constitutional grounds – and would be more
transparent, reliable, and equitable in general – if the legislature formally
recognized that its utility comes from keeping Alaskan money in Alaska.
II. THE ORIGINS AND LEGALITY OF THE PERMANENT FUND
DIVIDEND PROGRAM
The revenue that created the PFD comes from “large oil reserves on
state-owned land in the Prudhoe Bay area of Alaska,”18 the discovery of
which in 1967 radically reshaped Alaska’s fiscal health: “The State, which
had a total budget of $ 124 million in 1969, before the oil revenues began to
flow into the state coffers, received $ 3.7 billion in petroleum revenues
during the 1981 fiscal year.”19 In 1976, less than a decade after its
discovery, this newfound wealth prompted prospective-looking Alaskan
legislators and voters to amend the state’s constitution to require that “[a]t
14

See United States v. Sabil Mujahid, No. 3:10-cr-00091(JWS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128738, at
*10 (D. Alaska Dec. 3, 2010). The defendant argued unsuccessfully that the District Court of Alaska
should follow the Alaska state court system and select jurors from a list of Alaskans who received PFDs
because the state system “is a model of inclusiveness and representativeness.” Id.
15
Wankyo Chung & Beomsoo Kim, Money Transfer and Birth Weight A Causal Link from Alaska,
ECONWEB.UMD.EDU 1, 9 (March 29, 2011), http://econweb.umd.edu/~davis/eventpapers/KimMoney.pdf.
16
Id. at 3.
17
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
18
Id. at 56 (citations omitted).
19
Id.
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least twenty-five per cent of all mineral lease rentals, royalties, royalty sale
proceeds, federal mineral revenue sharing payments and bonuses received
by the State . . . be placed in a permanent fund.”20 The amendment
comports well with the Alaska Constitution’s mandate that “[t]he legislature
shall provide for the utilization, development, and conservation of all natural
resources belonging to the State, including land and waters, for the
maximum benefit of its people.”21 And Alaskans have benefitted as a result
of the PFD program. For example, one commentator attributes Alaska’s
income distribution, one of the most equitable in the country, to the
“dramatic effect” of the PFD, noting that
in the last ten years the income of the poorest fifth of Alaska
families increased 28 percent compared to a 7 percent
increase for the richest fifth. In contrast, for the entire
United States over the same period, the increase for the
poorest fifth was 0.8 percent compared to 14.9 percent for
the richest fifth.22
A. Alaska’s First PFD Program Violated the U.S. Constitution: the Zobel
Ruling
Debate over how best to utilize the Permanent Fund focused on two
vying notions: either use it like a savings account or else treat it as
investment capital for development projects throughout Alaska.23 Because a
fund that benefitted the people more directly would keep the money out of
the hands of politicians while also perhaps combatting high population turn
over, the idea of a cash distribution to all Alaskans became increasingly
popular.24 In 1980, Governor Hammond encouraged the legislature to enact
a scheme to disburse this wealth to Alaskans,25 but it faced an immediate
constitutional challenge: because it allocated payments based on years
resided in Alaska, entitling a life-long resident to roughly twenty times the
amount a newcomer would receive, the United States Supreme Court found
the statute violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth

20

ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 15.
ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
Deborah Groban Olson, Fair Exchange: Providing Citizens with Equity Managed by a
Community Trust, in Return for Government Subsidies or Tax Breaks to Businesses, 15 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 231, 299–300 (2006) (citing Jared Bernstein, et al., Pulling Apart: A State-by-State Analysis
of Income Trends, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES 22 (Jan. 2000),
http://www.cbpp.org/archiveSite/1-18-00sfp.pdf).
23
Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 2.
24
Id. at 2–4. The popular distrust of Alaska’s state government at this time stemmed from how it
had quickly spent a $900 million payment made by oil companies, leaving behind a bad taste of “bigger
government without an enhanced ability to pay for it.” Id. at 2.
25
Id. at 4.
21
22
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Amendment.26 The Zobel Court failed to see how Alaska’s statute rationally
related to the distinctions it sought to make.27
First, against the state’s argument that a payout tailored to one’s
length of residency would create an incentive for newcomers to migrate to
Alaska and maintain residency there, the Court objected that the smaller
payments available to newcomers would have the opposite effect: if Alaska
wanted to entice new residents to settle within its borders, larger payments
would be more appropriate.28 Second, although Alaska justified the unequal
payout on the grounds that it would encourage residents to become more
aware of and involved in the fund’s management and expenditure,29 the
Court found no rational connection between this goal and the state’s
insistence on calculating payments retroactively based on residency.30
Finally, while Alaska argued that rewarding citizens for past contributions
was a legitimate state purpose, the Court thought otherwise: if such
reasoning were upheld, nothing would stop access to other more finite state
resources – such as student loans, civil service jobs, or government contracts
– from being apportioned according to one’s length of residency within the
state.31 Alaska’s law bent on dividing citizens “into expanding numbers of
permanent classes” could not stand.32 After the Zobel ruling, the Alaska
legislature crafted a simpler payout scheme that allocated an equal amount
to every Alaskan regardless of their length of residency.33
B. The PFD’s Current Statutory and Administrative Form
Now, an Alaskan may claim a PFD if she: (1) files an application;
(2) is a state resident when she does so; (3) was a state resident during the
qualifying year;34 (4) was physically present in the state for a continuous 72
hours during any time within “the prior two years before the current
dividend year;” and (5) is a U.S citizen or reasonably legitimate federal
facsimile thereof.35 Parents may apply for their minor children or disabled

26
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982). The original dividend program created $50 dividend
units: every year of residency since Alaska became a state in 1959 equated to one unit for citizens over
the age of 18. Id. at 57.
27
Id. at 65.
28
Id. at 61–62 & n.9.
29
Id. at 61 n.7. At the time, the state argued that a per capita distribution, as opposed to its weighted
distribution scheme, would deplete the permanent fund too quickly as population increased, which would
in turn put popular pressure on the legislature to make riskier investments; it also argued that a “per
capita distribution would encourage rapacious development of natural resources.” Id. at 62.
30
Id. at 61–63. Despite what the state thought was a logical and well-formulated argument on this
point, the Court was of a different mindset: “We think not.” Id. at 63.
31
Id. at 64.
32
Id.
33
Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 5.
34
See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(6) (2014) (“‘qualifying year’ means the year immediately
preceding January 1 of the current dividend year.”).
35
Id. § 43.23.005(a) (2014).
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or incompetent individuals.36 An otherwise eligible Alaskan who either dies
after applying for a PFD or before she could have applied still has an
interest in the PFD recoverable by her successor or personal estate
representative.37
Although the general rule is that one may not be absent from the
state for longer than 180 days and still claim a dividend, there are many
exceptions to this rule.38 The following is a non-exhaustive list of
acceptable reasons to leave Alaska that do not defeat PFD eligibility so long
as they are properly documented and proven: becoming a full-time student
at a secondary or postsecondary institution;39 serving in the United States
military on active duty or, as a spouse or minor dependent, accompanying
someone who is;40 receiving medical treatment;41 caring for a dying relative
or settling the estate of a deceased one;42 serving in the United States
Congress as a member or that member’s staff;43 volunteering in the Peace
Corps;44 or competing in the Olympics.45
Alaska defines residency as “being physically present in the state
with the intent to remain in the state indefinitely and to make a home in the
state.”46 However, for purposes of PFD eligibility, “the legislature has given
broad discretion to the commissioner [of the PFD program] to determine the
factors which define a permanent resident.”47 In fact, the legislature requires
the commissioner to adopt administrative regulations to determine “the
eligibility of individuals for permanent fund dividends.”48 Pursuant to this
authority, there are currently eleven administrative regulations creating
bright-line rules (and some murkier ones) to streamline the eligibilitydetermination process.49 Among the most prominently applied of these are
36
Id. § 43.23.005(c). Children, upon reaching majority, may file for dividends owed them from
years past if they were otherwise eligible but their parent or guardian failed to timely file. ALASKA
ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.133 (2008). This Comment will not deal with why Alaskan law does not
provide for how a parent should spend or save their child’s dividends. Alaska’s legislature has, however,
set up a fund – the University of Alaska College Savings Plan – wherein parents can deposit 50% of their
child’s dividend for use as in-state college tuition; the Alaska Department of Revenue also contributes to
the fund. ALASKA STAT. § 14.40.807 (2007). For treatment of this issue in the context of a national
discussion, see Donald B. Tobin, Investing in Our Children: A Not So Radical Proposal, 73 U. CIN. L.
REV. 457, 477–80 (2004) (noting that “[a]lthough the [Alaska Supreme] court has held that a parent has a
right to control a child’s dividend, it is unclear whether such control allows the parent to take ownership
of the dividend, or whether the parent has some duty to the child with regard to the dividend.”).
37
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(h) (2014).
38
See id. § 43.23.008(a).
39
Id. § 43.23.008(a)(1).
40
Id. § 43.23.008(a)(3).
41
Id. § 43.23.008(a)(5).
42
Id. § 43.23.008(a)(6), (8).
43
Id. § 43.23.008(a)(9)-(10).
44
Id. § 43.23.008(a)(14).
45
Id. § 43.23.008(a)(15).
46
Id. § 01.10.055(a) (2007).
47
Church v. Dep’t of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Alaska 1999).
48
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.015(a) (2014).
49
See generally, ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.103 (2011) (Application generally); id. §
23.113 (2011) (Application on behalf of a child); id. § 23.123 (2008) (Application on behalf of a

Published by eCommons, 2013

454

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:3

the sections dealing with establishing and maintaining Alaska residency and
allowable absences.50 Physical presence in Alaska alone is insufficient to
establish residency for PFD purposes; an additional step, such as obtaining
employment or purchasing a home, is necessary.51 Generally, acts that
disqualify an applicant from receiving her PFD involve asserting residency
in another state, usually to obtain a benefit, and include any of the following
acts, if done outside of Alaska: maintaining a home, paying “resident taxes,”
registering a vehicle or registering to vote, acquiring “a driver’s license,
business license, or professional license,” and, as a catch-all, receiving
“benefits under a claim of residency in . . . another jurisdiction.”52
Furthermore, there is a presumption that an applicant who has left
Alaska for whatever statutorily allowable reason does not intend to return to
Alaska and remain there indefinitely if she has been outside of Alaska for
more than five years and, during each of those years, she spent roughly more
time outside of Alaska than within it.53 This presumption may be overcome,
however, by a showing that the applicant in fact returned to Alaska for at
least thirty cumulative days at any point during the five-year absence and
that she retained the subjective intent necessary to remain an Alaska
resident.54
C. PFD Data for 2011 – What’s at Stake
All eligible Alaskans dutifully apply for a PFD, and they have good
reason to do so: “[s]ince [the PFD’s] inception, Alaskans have received on
average $ 1,100 per year between 1982 and 2010” from the fund.55 In 2011,
672,237 Alaskans, or 93% of the state’s population, applied for a PFD.56 Of
those applicants, 615,122, or 92%, actually received a dividend, meaning
that 57,115 applicants were denied dividends.57 In 2011, Alaska had a

disabled, incompetent, or other adult); id. § 23.133 (2008) (Application for a prior year dividend); id. §
23.143 (2013) (Establishing and maintaining Alaska residency); id. § 23.154 (2005) (Eligibility of
aliens); id. § 23.163 (2014) (Allowable absences); id. § 23.173 (2014) (Proof of eligibility); id. § 23.183
(1997) (Individuals identified as incarcerated for certain offenses); id. § 23.193 (2009) (Payment of
dividends to individuals identified as non-compliant sex offenders); id. § 23.993 (2013) (Definitions).
50
Id. § 23.143 (2013); id. § 23.163 (2014) (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(d)(e) (2014)).
51
Id. § 23.143(c)-(d) (2013).
52
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(e)(4) (2014).
53
See § 43.23.008(d) (2014); see also discussion infra Section III.A.
54
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(d)-(e) (2014).
55
Griffin, supra note 12, at 79 (citations omitted).
56
2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 30.
57
Id. at 30. To put this in perspective, Alaska’s second largest city, Fairbanks, has a population of
30,970. What is the population?, EXPLORE FAIRBANKS ALASKA, http://www.explorefairbanks.com/
articles/detail/8/what-is-the-population (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). Forty-one percent of Alaska’s
population – or 291,826 people – reside in Anchorage. Anchorage Population and Other Fun Anchorage
Facts, THE OFFICIAL SOURCE FOR ANCHORAGE, ALASKA TRAVEL INFORMATION,
http://www.anchorage.net/anchorage-population-and-other-fun-anchorage-facts (last visited Nov. 16,
2014).
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population of 722,190;58 during that same year the Permanent Fund
Dividend Division (“PFDD”), the purpose of which is the “timely payment
of dividends to eligible Alaskans,”59 was contacted 147,982 times by
individuals seeking assistance in either filing or determining their eligibility
for a PFD.60 Assuming no one contacted the PFDD more than once, one in
five Alaskans did so in 2011,61 which either speaks to the PFDD’s
usefulness or else to the opacity of the administrative codes that have
sprouted up around the concept of eligibility. Only 42% of 2011 applicants
were born in Alaska, and only 91,124 applicants – or 13% of the population
– have received all 30 PFDs since the program began in 1982.62 The state of
Alaska has paid out $18.8 billion to the 17.2 million applicants who have
filed for PFDs since 1982.63
D. The State of the Law: Three Alaska Supreme Court Decisions
In each of the following cases, the Alaska Supreme Court deferred
to the PFD statutes or else to the relevant administrative codes promulgated
and interpreted by the Alaska Department of Revenue, PFDD.64
Constitutional challenges to the allocation of Alaska’s mineral wealth
through the PFD have been subjected to a minimal scrutiny analysis because
the PFD is a mere economic interest65 as opposed to a more fundamentally
protected constitutional right, such as the freedom of speech. By and large,
these challenges have foundered against the strength of the “fair and
substantial relationship” that the body of law protecting PFDs bears to
Alaska’s “legitimate governmental objectives.”66 These objectives are:
‘(1) to provide a mechanism for equitable distribution to the
people of Alaska of at least a portion of the state’s energy
wealth derived from the development and production of the
natural resources belonging to them as Alaskans; (2) to
encourage persons to maintain their residence in Alaska and
to reduce population turnover in the state; and (3) to
encourage increased awareness and involvement by the
58

2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 30.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 12.
61
See id. at 12, 30.
62
Id. at 19, 31.
63
Id. at 30.
64
The PFDD determines applicants’ eligibility in order to faithfully distribute the annual dividend
paid to Alaska residents. About Us, ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND DIV.,
http://pfd.alaska.gov/DivisionInfo/AboutUs (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). The PFDD’s mission is “[t]o
administer the permanent fund dividend program assuring that: all eligible Alaskans receive timely
dividends; fraud is prosecuted; and all internal and external stakeholders are treated with respect.”
Mission, ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND DIV., http://pfd.alaska.gov/
Home/MissionStatement (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
65
Church v. Dep’t of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Alaska 1999).
66
Ross v. State, 292 P.3d 906, 911 (Alaska 2012), superseded by statute, ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008
(2014); see infra note 98 and accompanying text.
59
60
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residents of the state in the management and expenditure of
the Alaska permanent fund.’67
Although the Zobel court struck down Alaska’s initial PFD
distribution scheme, Alaska’s Supreme Court continues to rely on these
same legitimate state interests to which the former scheme had no rational
relation. Even though it has divided its citizenry into one large class of
individuals eligible to receive a PFD, and a much smaller class of ineligible
citizens,68 the state continues to rely on, and the Alaska Supreme Court
continues to uphold, the same rationale analyzed by the Zobel court, with
the exception that the PFD no longer purports to retroactively reward more
permanent citizens to the exclusion of newcomers based on a pastcontributions-to-the-commonwealth theory.69
The following three cases and their cursory analyses of the
Constitutional issues involved, both state and federal, show the extent to
which the court permits the PFDD free reign in defining, refining, and redefining PFD eligibility.
1. Church v. Department of Revenue
In Church v. Department of Revenue, Patrick Church left Alaska for
274 days to care for his dying mother before an exception existed for caring
for a dying family member;70 when he was denied a PFD, he brought
constitutional claims against the Alaska Department of Revenue, PFDD,
alleging it violated “his procedural and substantive due process rights, his
equal protection rights, his right to travel, and his rights to privacy and
family relationships.”71
Although Church violated the regulation on its face because his
absence from Alaska exceeded 180 days, he argued the regulation itself
violated the legislative intent behind the PFD program.72 However, the
Court noted that a regulation can “‘exclude [PFD] applicants who arguably
fall within the statutory definition of eligible applicants’” unless the
67
Id. at 910 (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61 n.7 (1982)) (quoting 1980 Alaska Sess.
Laws, ch. 21, § 1(b) (repealed 1982)).
68
See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
69
See, e.g., Schafer v. Vest, 680 P.2d 1169, 1170–71 (Alaska 1984) (“After Zobel III, it is clear that
the federal Constitution will not tolerate a state benefit program which ‘creates fixed, permanent
distinctions between … concededly bona fide residents, based on how long they have been in the
State.’”) (quoting Zobel, 457 U.S. at 59); “The state concedes that in view of the holding in Zobel III -that residents cannot be rewarded for past contributions measured simply by length of residence in the
state,” the state cannot rely on a past contributions theory to justify its plan to sell land to Borough
residents at a discount commensurate with their length of residency in the Borough. Gilman v. Martin,
662 P.2d 120, 128 (Alaska 1983).
70
Church, 973 P.2d at 1127.
71
Id. at 1127. The court summarily treated his right to privacy and family relationships as a
corollary of his right to travel. Id. at 1131–32.
72
Id. at 1128.
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regulation is unreasonable, arbitrary, or contrary to legislative intent.73 The
180 day cut-off regulation at issue was in sync with the legislative purpose
of the PFD: “‘to limit payment of dividends to permanent residents,’”74 and
it also created a bright-line rule useful in quickly determining eligibility so
as not to clog the PFDD’s administrative system.75 Although by statute,
Church had the subjective intent to remain in Alaska while caring for his
mother out of state, for PFD purposes he could not be labeled a “permanent
resident.”76
Church’s procedural due process claim failed because no law
existed under which his argument could prevail; the PFDD was not required
to conduct a formal hearing for such cases.77 Under Alaska’s substantive
due process standard, the alleged violation must “shock the universal sense
of justice” before a claim exists: the Court stated simply that the PFDD’s
“requirements are a reasonable way to ensure that only legitimate permanent
residents receive PFDs.”78 Against Church’s argument that he had been
denied equal protection relative to others who received PFDs because they
were allowably absent while he was arbitrarily not, the Court noted that a
PFD is only an “economic interest” and as such deserves minimal scrutiny.79
Applying this test, the Court found that the PFDD’s bright-line rule that cut
off Church’s eligibility was an efficient way “to limit PFD eligibility to
permanent residents.”80
Finally, Church argued that, under an equal protection analysis, he
73

Id. (quoting State Dep’t of Revenue v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 625 (Alaska 1993)).
Id. (quoting Brodigan v. Alaska Dep’t of Revenue, 900 P.2d 728, 732 (Alaska 1995)).
See id. at 1129.
76
Id. The Court uses the phrase permanent resident eleven times in its opinion without once
proffering a definition. See generally id. The idea of what it means to be a permanent resident has been
left to the discretion of lawmakers and law-interpreters: it entails a factually sensitive inquiry centered
around an individual’s subjective intent and, for PFD purposes, has been applied to newcomers to the
state as well as to residents like Church, who has resided in Alaska since 1975. Id. at 1127. The closest
any Alaska court has come to ascribing a workable meaning to the concept of a permanent resident was
to state that “[t]he legislature has given broad discretion to the commissioner to determine the factors
which define a permanent resident.” Id. at 1129.
77
Id. at 1129–30.
78
Id. at 1130.
79
Id. Unlike Federal equal protection analysis, which determines the level of scrutiny that applies to
the challenged legislation based on the classifications it makes, Alaska equal protection law has
developed a sliding scale approach. See Paul E. McGreal, Alaska Equal Protection: Constitutional Law
or Common Law?, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 209, 252 (1998) (stating that “[Alaska’s] pure means-end analysis
differs from the federal equal protection test, which uses means-end analysis to smoke out illegitimate
government purposes.”); see also State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1192–93 (Alaska 1983) (noting that
“[i]n contrast to the rigid tiers of federal equal protection analysis, we have postulated a single sliding
scale of review ranging from relaxed scrutiny to strict scrutiny. The applicable standard of review for a
given case is to be determined by the importance of the individual rights asserted and by the degree of
suspicion with which we view the resulting classification scheme.”). When the sliding scale stops at
minimal scrutiny, the test is whether “the challenged enactment was designed to achieve a legitimate
governmental objective, and that the means bear a ‘fair and substantial’ relationship to the
accomplishment of that objective.” Underwood v. State, 881 P.2d 322, 325 (Alaska 1994) (citing State
Dep’t of Revenue v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 629 (Alaska 1993); State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 158
(Alaska 1991)).
80
Church, 973 P.2d at 1131.
74
75
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was entitled to heightened scrutiny because his right to travel had been
impeded.81 Although one of the legitimate state interests relied on by the
Court was the PFD’s ability “to encourage people to stay in Alaska,”82 the
Court nonetheless held that any infringement on Church’s right to travel was
“relatively small and would not be likely to deter a person from traveling.”83
Weighed against the over-arching purposes of the PFD program, the Court
found his right to travel was not impaired enough to merit judicial protection
while again highlighting Mr. Church’s mere economic expectancy interest
in a PFD.84 Patrick Church, an Alaska resident since 1975, was not a
resident for PFD purposes on the year in question, and his claim faltered and
broke down against the logic of the PFD regulations, “which ensure that
benefits ‘provided for residents are enjoyed only by residents.’”85
2. Brodigan v. Alaska Department of Revenue
In an earlier case, Brodigan v. Alaska Department of Revenue,
which helped to lay the constitutional framework relied upon by the Church
Court, the Alaska Supreme Court had to determine whether a snowbird86
couple merited PFDs.87 The Brodigans moved to Alaska in 1962, and three
censuses counted them as Alaska residents.88 However, Mr. Brodigan had
vascular problems that his physician recommended he treat by going south
for the winter.89 One such six-and-a-half-month absence in the winter of
1989–1990 led to the Brodigans not receiving their 1990 PFDs because of
how a PFDD regulation90 confined the statutory meaning of an allowable
medical absence91 to exclude seasonal travel for health issues.92 The Court
affirmed the lower court’s reasoning that “medical treatment” implied
“some specific therapeutic application by medical personnel” rather than
merely basking in the sun under doctor’s orders.93
The PFDD regulation was therefore reasonable: because the
Brodigans became snowbirds in their old age, they could no longer legally
81

Id. at 1130.
Id.
83
Id. at 1131.
84
Id.
85
See id. (quoting Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 n.3 (1986)). As
Church’s case worked its way through the courts, the Alaska legislature enacted ALASKA STAT. §
43.23.095(8) (1997) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(a)(6–7) (2014)), allowing for
absences to care for ailing relatives). Church, 973 P.2d at 1129 n.4.
86
“[O]ne who travels to warm climes for the winter.” Snowbird Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/snowbird?show=0&t=1351473199 (last visited Nov. 16,
2014).
87
Brodigan v. Alaska Dep’t of Revenue, 900 P.2d 728, 729 (Alaska 1995).
88
Id. at 729 & n.1.
89
Id. at 729.
90
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15 § 23.175(c)(6) (1990) (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(a)(5)
(2014)).
91
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(b) (1990) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(7) (2007)).
92
Brodigan, 900 P.2d at 731 n.7.
93
Id. at 731.
82
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form the intent necessary to remain in the state permanently and
consequently could not receive a PFD.94 The Court noted that, were it to
strike down the regulation, anyone could come to the state seasonally,
establish paper connections to Alaska, claim that a physician ordered
climatic change to improve their health, travel back to their actual state of
residence for the winter, and then benefit from the PFD program.95 The
PFDD’s narrower definition of “medical treatment” that excluded travel for
climatic reasons helped to preserve PFDs for “legitimate claims of
permanent residents.”96 The same balancing test at work in Church quashed
the Brodigans’ equal protection claim based on an alleged violation of their
right to travel.97
3. Ross v. State
In Ross v. State,98 a lifelong Alaskan and marine argued that a 1998
amendment to the dividend qualifications, which cut-off eligibility for those
allowably absent after ten years,99 violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s
equal protection clause.100 Ross left Alaska in 1990 to serve in the Marine
Corps for eighteen years; the ten-year statute went into effect in 2009,
denying him and his children a PFD for the first time.101 Ross argued that
the statute unconstitutionally distinguished between absent residents and
non-absent residents, noting that the rule did not apply to Alaskan members
of Congress.102 Again, the Court applied minimal scrutiny because the PFD
94
Id. at 731 n.7. Although the Brodigans were still Alaska residents, they were not permanent
residents that year for purposes of PFD eligibility. See id. at 732.
95
Id. at 732.
96
Id.
97
See id. at 734 & n.13; see also supra text accompanying notes 81–85.
98
Ross v. State, 292 P.3d 906 (Alaska 2012), superseded by statute, ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008
(2014). This statute repealed subsection (C), the subsection under which Ross had sued, and was enacted
after Mr. Ross personally lobbied the Alaska Legislature and “expressed hope that his personal story and
his thoughts on how the 10-year rule unfairly penalizes those in the military will convince [the legislature
to allow long-absent military personnel to receive PFDs.].” Allowable Absence: Hearing on H.B. 52
Before the House Comm. on State Affairs, 2013 Leg., 28th Sess. (2013) (statement of Michael Paschall,
Staff for Rep. Eric Feige, bill sponsor), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute .asp?
ch=H&beg_line=00448&end_line=00518&session=28&comm=STA&date=20130129&time=0804).
99
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(c) (2007) (stating that “[a]n otherwise eligible individual who has
been eligible for the immediately preceding 10 dividends despite being absent from the state for more
than 180 days in each of the related 10 qualifying years is only eligible for the current year dividend if
the individual was absent 180 days or less during the qualifying year.”), repealed by H.B. 52, 28th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2013); see supra note 34 (defining qualifying year). The sponsor of the bill that
struck subsection (C) entirely, Rep. Eric Feige, issued a sponsor statement, which reads in part:
“Although these individuals choose to serve in the Armed Forces of the United States, once they are
sworn into service, they do not have the option to choose to be physically present in Alaska. It is time to
correct this injustice and allow Alaska residents who decide to join the military the opportunity to
continue to receive their deserved Permanent Fund Dividend while at the same time making sure that
only those that truly intend to return to Alaska continue to receive a dividend on an allowable absence.”
Eric Feige, Sponsor Statement: HB 52, THE ALASKA HOUSE MAJORITY (Jan. 16, 2013, 10:21 PM),
http://www.housemajority.org/2013/01/16/sponsor-statement-hb-52/.
100
Ross, 292 P.3d at 908.
101
Id. at 907–08.
102
Id. at 909.
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is “merely an economic interest,” and it therefore sought a legitimate
governmental objective to which the statute bore a fair and substantial
relationship.103 While Ross’ argument focused on discrediting the legitimate
state interests relied on since Zobel,104 the state proffered a legitimate
interest in addition to the Zobel interests that the statute sought to uphold:
preventing fraud.105 The record showed Ross understood he was the
exception to the perceived norm of a service member serving a three-year
tour in Alaska, establishing residency, and then collecting PFDs based on
the allowable military absence statute: the ten-year rule was meant to cut off
this windfall to non-permanent, long-absent residents.106 As in Church, the
statute in question eased the administrative burden of distributing the PFDs
by making the determination of eligibility easier – again, the court reiterated
that only “permanent residents” merited PFDs.107
As for Ross’ argument that the statute treated him differently than
Congress members, the Court deferred to the legislature, which “apparently
concluded that the ties that bind a member of Congress or a congressional
staffer to Alaska are strong enough to indicate an intention to return to
Alaska indefinitely to reside, thus vitiating concerns of fraud and dividends
being paid to non-Alaskans.”108
PFDs have also been denied to: a student whose crash while driving
from Alaska back to his college in Utah caused him to miss the fall
registration deadline, making him an unwilling part-time student;109 several
103

Id. at 910 (citations omitted).
Id. at 911. Ross argued: (1) that the legitimate interest of equitably distributing the fund failed
because it would be inequitable to deny an Alaskan marine his benefits; (2) that the state interest in
maintaining its citizenry was disserved because the law would encourage him to find a more beneficial
state in which to reside; and (3) that his involvement in the funds democratic management might end
since a denial of benefits would encourage him to seek residency elsewhere. Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 912.
107
Id. But compare Heller v. Dep’t of Revenue, 314 P.3d 69, 75 n.19 (Alaska 2013) (correctly
noting that the applicant, Mr. Heller, met state residency requirements and that therefore the only issue
was whether he was a permanent resident for PFD purposes) with id. at 81 (suggesting that “[f]ar from
singling out newcomers,” PFD eligibility requirements are intended to ensure that PFDs are distributed
“only to state residents” seemingly without realizing that Mr. Heller’s state residency had already been
conceded). What is more, through an unfortunate use of words, the Heller court concludes that a
subsection of the allowable absences statute “was enacted in an attempt to distinguish residents from
nonresidents.” Id. at 80. However, as was stated in Brodigan, “[t]hough the applicants are not eligible to
receive Alaska Permanent Fund Dividends for 1989, that does not mean that they are not considered
residents for other purposes.” Brodigan v. Alaska Dep't of Revenue, 900 P.2d 728, 733 n.12 (Alaska
1995). The relevant inquiry has always been whether or not an applicant was a permanent resident for
PFD purposes, not whether PFD eligibility determines Alaskan residency. See Harrod v. State, 255 P.3d
991, 997 (Alaska 2011); Eagle v. Dep’t of Revenue, 153 P.3d 976, 980 (Alaska 2007); Dep’t of Revenue
v. Andrade, 23 P.3d 58, 71–72 (Alaska 2001); Schikora v. State, 7 P.3d 938, 945 (Alaska 2000); Church
v. Dep’t of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1125, 1128–29 (Alaska 1999); Brodigan, 900 P.2d at 732; Dep’t of
Revenue, Permanent Fund Dividend Div. v. Bradley, 896 P.2d 237, 239 (Alaska 1995); Dep’t of
Revenue, Permanent Fund Dividend Div. v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 628 (Alaska 1993).
108
Ross, 292 P.3d at 913.
109
See Bradley, 896 P.2d at 238. The court emphasized a now-defunct Administrative Code that
refined an allowable educational absence to mean “‘enrollment in good standing as a full-time student at
a college, university, junior or community college.’” Id. at 238–39 (quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit.
104
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incarcerated felons who alleged, among other claims, that Alaska Statute
section 43.23.005(d) (2012)110 violated “the equal protection clause [and]
the due process clause . . . in the Alaska and United States Constitutions”;111
and two immigrants who entered the United States without inspection,
wound up in Alaska, were denied PFDs, and then argued their intent to
remain in Alaska should trump their illegal status that could cut off that
intent at any time.112 The rationale for upholding these denials originated in
the first place in administrative hearings, where Administrative Law Judges
(“ALJs”) either apply bright-line rules or weigh equitable factors to
determine who is and who is not a permanent resident for purposes of PFD
eligibility.113 These proceedings perform the grunt work of defining what it
means to be a deserving Alaska resident.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS ANALYZED THROUGH THE LENS OF ZOBEL
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court rejected Alaska’s effort to
reward past contribution to the state as inconsistent with the equal protection
guaranteed to all citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment.114 However,
Alaska’s impetus to reward past contributions to the state, although no
longer in the form of unequal dividend payments, survives in the rulings of
ALJs who, when faced with a close call, allow the equitable factor of longstanding Alaskan residency to tip the scales in favor of PFD eligibility. This
Comment in no way seeks to impugn the integrity of these ALJs who
tirelessly apply the law to the facts at hand in an unbiased manner.115 But
15, § 23.175 (1990) (repealed Jan. 1, 1993). This comment will not address the problems students face
when applying for PFDs, except to note that students have had particular trouble with checking the right
box in response to the application’s question of whether they intend to return to Alaska to remain there
indefinitely. See generally DS, OAH No. 12-0140-PFD (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Oct. 15, 2012); J.S.,
OAH No. 11-0241-PFD (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Aug. 30, 2011); E.M.T., OAH No. 09-0581-PFD
(Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Feb. 3, 2010); M.B., OAH No. 09-0130-PFD (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Aug.
13, 2009); M.G.B., OAH No. 09-0474-PFD (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Jan. 25, 2009); M.H.M., OAH
No. 11-0168-PFD at 2 n.13 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue July 19, 2011) (quoting the “actual question” that
appears on the PFD application).
110
Anyone who has been convicted of a felony in Alaska during the qualifying year and has been
sentenced, or else incarcerated for a felony or misdemeanor preceded by two prior misdemeanors or one
prior felony is not eligible to receive a PFD. E.R., OAH No. 10-0063-PFD (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue
April 13, 2010).
111
State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 156 (Alaska 1991). This Comment will not deal with whether or
not a felon should or should not have a legal right to a PFD. See generally Hertz v. Storer, 943 P.2d 725
(Alaska 1997); Morgan v. Dep’t of Revenue, 813 P.2d 295 (Alaska 1991) (exploring the issue of a
felon’s PFD eligibility).
112
Dep't of Revenue, Permanent Fund Dividend Div. v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 623 (Alaska 1993).
This article will not deal with how an immigrant’s status interacts with her ability to form the intent
necessary to be a resident of Alaska. For a brief discussion of this issue, see Stanley H. Friedelbaum,
Traditional State Interests and Constitutional Norms: Impressive Cases in Conventional Settings, 64
ALB. L. REV. 1245, 1262–66 (2001).
113
See generally Permanent Fund Dividend Eligibility, STATE OF ALASKA, DEP’T OF ADMIN., OFFICE
OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, http://aws.state.ak.us/officeofadminhearings/Category.aspx?CatName= PFD (last
visited Nov. 26, 2014) [hereinafter PFD ELIGIBILITY]
114
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982); see supra Section II.A.
115
See generally PFD ELIGIBILITY, supra note 113 (listing approximately 500 downloadable
administrative opinions from which this comment has selected an illustrative handful).
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when one of the factors an ALJ can consider when determining PFD
eligibility is “the length of the individual’s absence compared to the time the
individual spent in Alaska before departing on the absence,”116 it is clear that
those who have more bona fide Alaskan connections to begin with are more
likely than newcomers to the state to receive their annual payout. In
situations where all other factors are equal for PFD-purposes, the more
tenured the Alaska resident in question, the more accessible the dividend,
even though the concept that “some citizens are more equal than others”117
was excised from Alaskan jurisprudence over three decades ago.
This sort of inclusive favoritism grows out of Alaska’s unique boom
and bust lifestyle, encouraged by the discovery of gold at the beginning of
the last century and then by the discovery of oil and the construction of the
trans-Alaska pipeline.118 Alaska also booms perennially every summer
when a nearly continuous sun circles over the long hours of the construction
season, or when salmon return to their rivers, and out of state workers come
to help in their harvest.119 The Alaska Supreme Court, upholding the
legality of the first PFD scheme that compensated the longevity of one’s
residency, noted the economic situation unique to Alaska:
Throughout its history, from the days of the Gold Rush to
the recent oil pipeline period, Alaska has been prone to the
phenomenon that large numbers of people from without the
state move in, derive great financial and other benefits from
the state’s resources and opportunities, and then move out to
enjoy the fruits of their labors elsewhere. This obviously
results in a great drain of financial and other resources from
the state.120
The Court felt Alaska was particularly prone to such a phenomenon
“due to its harsh climate, its high cost of living, and its geographical
isolation from the other states.”121 The Court empathized with long-time
residents, a hardy, eclectic lot who had weathered many winters, and
deemed their perseverance meritorious: “Alaskan residents who have chosen
116
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.163(g)(1) (2010) (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. §
43.23.008(e)(1) (2014)). The statute, borrowing heavily from the now-defunct administrative code, now
reads: “the length of time the individual was absent from the state compared to the length of time the
individual was physically present in the state.” Id.
117
Zobel, 457 U.S. at 71 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Gregory S. Fisher, Historical Bar: “Law
in the Last Frontier: Commemorating the District of Alaska’s 50th Anniversary, 34 AK BAR RAG 19, 20
(2010) (“the dynamics of . . . exclusionary preferences will persist in Alaska. Local hire is a ‘can’t miss’
vote multiplier. No politician can resist trumpeting support ‘for Alaska,’ . . . we will probably see more
cases involving preferences in the next 50 years.”).
118
See Scott Goldsmith, The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend: A Case Study in the Direct
Distribution of Resource Rent 1, 2 (2011), http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/2011_01PFRevenueWatchPaper.pdf.
119
See infra note 341 and accompanying text.
120
Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 459 (Alaska 1980), rev’d 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
121
Id. at 460.
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to stay, to enjoy the fruits of their labor here, and to make a lasting
contribution, tangible or intangible, to the state's culture and
commonwealth” could receive a PFD up to twenty-one times larger than a
newcomer to the state.122 This self-rewarding sentiment that propped up the
defunct PFD scheme is no longer good law, but vestiges of it resurface to
inequitably haunt the administrative hearings on PFD eligibility.
The administrative hearing process will be briefly described before
its formal opinions are analyzed. When the PFDD rejects an application, the
PFDD mails a letter explaining the reasons for the denial.123 If the letter’s
recipient feels as though the PFDD reached its decision in error, that
individual has the right to an administrative appeal.124 The appeal must be
filed within thirty days after the individual was notified of the PFDD’s
adverse decision.125 At this stage, the individual participates in an informal
conference where she is entitled to an explanation of the PFDD’s decision as
well as the portion of her file relied on to reach that decision.126 The
individual may supply documents in her favor to contest the adverse
decision.127 The ALJ must “promptly render a written decision” that
“identif[ies] the issues in controversy for purposes of further appeal.”128
This written decision represents the outcome of the informal appeals
process, which may be appealed to the formal hearing stage, the last
administrative step before the case can enter Alaska’s court system.129 Only
107 cases were resolved at the formal appeal level in 2011,130 whereas 695
cases were resolved on formal appeal in 2002.131 The outcomes of these
formal appeals are the subject of this Section.
A. The Thirty-Days-in-Five-Years Presumption
Someone who has left Alaska under an allowable absence for more
122

Id. By way of analogy, the court reasoned that “[s]uch an attempt does not penalize those who
choose to leave any more than a firm’s awarding of a gold watch to a fifty-year employee penalizes
employees who leave before working for fifty years.” Id.
123
FAQ’s, STATE OF ALASKA, DEP’T OF REVENUE, PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND DIV.,
http://pfd.alaska.gov/FAQ/index#why (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) [hereinafter PFD FAQ’S] (click on
“Applications in Review or Denied Status,” then click on “What can I do if my dividend application is
denied and I disagree?”).
124
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.015(g) (2014). It costs $25 to appeal a decision, but the appellant may
recover the fee if she prevails. Id.
125
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 05.010(b)(5) (2013).
126
Id. § 05.020(a) (1998).
127
Id.
128
Id. § 05.020(b).
129
See generally id. § 05.030 (2013). The ALJ, also called a hearing officer, has broad authority to
“exercise all other powers necessary for the orderly and expeditious conduct of the hearing.” Id. §
05.030(b)(8). Accordingly, “[h]earsay evidence is admissible if in the judgment of the hearing officer it
is the kind of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious
affairs.” Id. § 05.030(h).
130
2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 16.
131
Permanent Fund Dividend Div. 2002 Annual Report, STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE,
PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND DIV. 1, 47 (2002), https://pfd.alaska.gov/Content/AnnualReports/2002
AnnualReport.pdf.
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than five years “is presumed not to have the intent to return to Alaska and
remain indefinitely in Alaska” and as a result will be ineligible to receive a
dividend.132 This presumption can be rebutted, however, by showing that
return trips to the state totaled at least thirty days during the five-year
absence.133 A rebuttal cannot rely on cold, hard numbers; rather, the ALJ
considers a host of equitable factors that bear on the applicant’s subjective
intent to return to the state and include: (1) the length of the absence
compared to the time spent in Alaska before the absence;134 (2) the
frequency and length of the trips back to Alaska;135 (3) whether intent to
return to Alaska is conditioned on uncontrollable circumstances, such as
job-availability in Alaska;136 (4) the extent to which settling down in another
state has occurred;137 (5) the priority given to Alaska “on an employment
assignment preference list, such as those used by military personnel;”138 (6)
the choice of a career that by its nature conflicts with the ability to reside in
Alaska;139 and (7) the preservation of ties to Alaska.140
Consider how these factors play out in the following formal
administrative hearings where each applicant was allowably absent because
of his or her military service but had not returned for the requisite thirty
days over the five preceding years.141 As will be discussed after the next
Section, the rational underlying these cases was codified by statute in 2013,
solving one problem the thirty-days-in-five-years presumption raised while
simultaneously creating a new one.142

132
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.163(f) (2010) (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. §
43.23.008(d) (2014)) (stating that if an applicant has been absent for over 180 days in each of the five
preceding years, then “the department shall presume that the individual is no longer a state resident.”).
Because each of the hearings discussed in this section apply the code and not the statute, the code will be
cited or quoted where appropriate.
133
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.163(h)(2) (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. §
43.23.008(d)(1) (2014) and arguably changing this discretionary factor into a bright-line rule).
134
Id. § 23.163(g)(1) (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(e)(1) (2014)).
135
Id. § 23.163(g)(2) (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(e)(2) (2014)).
136
Id. § 23.163(g)(3) (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(e)(3) (2014)).
137
Id. § 23.163(g)(4) (listing as ties “maintenance of homes, payment of resident taxes, vehicle
registrations, voter registration, driver’s licenses, or receipt of benefits under a claim of residency in
another state.”) (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(e)(4) (2014)).
138
Id. § 23.163(g)(5) (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(e)(5) (2014)). But see E. &
W.M., OAH No. 09-0003-PFD 1, 4 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Mar. 26, 2009) (describing an Army
member who protests that the military no longer uses “the traditional assignment preference list, or
‘dream sheet’” and suggesting that ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.163(g)(5) (2012) be rewritten
accordingly). However, as amended, ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(e)(5) (2014) retains the ‘dream sheet’
as a factor to consider when ascertaining one’s intent to return to Alaska and remain there indefinitely.
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(e)(5) (2014).
139
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.163(g)(6) (2010) (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. §
43.23.008(e)(3), (5) (2014)).
140
Id. § 23.163(g)(7) (listing as ties “ownership of real and personal property, voter registration,
professional and business licenses, and any other factors demonstrating the individual’s intent.”)
(codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(e)(4) (2014)).
141
See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(a)(3) (2014) (preserving PFD eligibility for “member[s] of the
armed forces of the United States”).
142
See discussion infra Section III.A.2.
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1. Selected Administrative Hearings
The Army assigned Mr. M.143 to Alaska in the winter of 1998–1999,
but he was reassigned out of state less than three years later, taking with him
his Alaskan bride, Ms. M.144 Throughout his absence, Mr. M. returned to
the state only three times: once for six days, once for a week, and again for
eight days, for a total of twenty-one days.145 In response to inquiries from
the PFDD, the couple indicated that, because of Mr. M.’s career choice, they
did not plan to return to Alaska and remain there indefinitely until 2018.146
The ALJ noted that, consistent with the transient lifestyle of most military
service-members, Mr. and Ms. M. had not established residency ties to any
other state, and Mr. M. had maintained paper ties – a bank account, current
voter registration, a driver’s license, and vehicle registration – with
Alaska.147 The ALJ also found that it would have been impracticable for
Mr. M., who spent nearly two out of the five years he was absent from
Alaska serving in Iraq, to visit Alaska while off at war.148
However, Mr. M.’s return visits to the state totaled less than thirty
days during the five-year absence, creating the rebuttable presumption that
Mr. M. severed his Alaskan residency.149 Weighing the first factor – length
of absence compared to time spent in Alaska pre-absence – the ALJ noted:
“[t]hree years spent in Alaska in a person’s early to mid 20s’ is not a strong
indication that the person will return to Alaska around the age of forty,”
apparently the age Mr. M. would by in 2018.150 Ultimately, the seven
factors comingled to deprive Mr. and Ms. M. of their 2007 PFDs; mere
paper ties along with Mr. M.’s brief three-year presence in the state to begin
were not enough for a PFD.151
Compare the denial of Mr. M.’s dividend to the awarding of one,
“by the scantest of margins,” to Mr. V., also a career army man who lived in
Alaska for four years – about a year longer than Mr. M. – before leaving the

143

All of the PFD opinions from the Office of Administrative Hearings abbreviate the appellant’s
name. See generally PFD ELIGIBILITY, supra note 115.
144
E. & W.M., OAH No. 09-0003-PFD 1, 1 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Mar. 26, 2009). Ms. M.’s
eligibility derives from her husband’s eligibility. See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(a)(3) (2007) (creating
an allowable absence for a military member’s spouse who accompanies that member on his or her
assignments).
145
E. & W.M., OAH No. 09-0003-PFD at 1.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 2.
148
Id. at 3.
149
Id. at 2. This presumption has since been codified as a bright-line rule. See discussion infra
Section III.A.2.
150
Id. at 3.
151
Id. at 5–6. The ALJ likened Mr. M.’s case to the case of a lifelong Alaskan absent for similar
reasons who only returned to the state for a total of one week over a five-year period but who was also
denied a divided. Id. (citing Anderson v. Dep't of Revenue, 26 P.3d 1106, 1110–11 (Alaska 2001) (noting
that Anderson’s evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption of non-residency but deferring to the
ALJ because his interpretation was equally plausible given the evidence)).
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state on military orders.152 Like Mr. M., Mr. V. also went to war for two
years, one year in Iraq and one in Afghanistan.153 And like Mr. M., Mr. V.
made it back to Alaska only three times over five years, but his visits totaled
twenty-six days, five days longer than Mr. M.’s visits.154 Like Mr. M., Mr.
V. maintained similar paper ties with Alaska and did not establish more
significant ties to any other state.155 Eligibility, then, came down to the
seven equitable factors listed in the Alaska Administrative Code title 15,
section 23.163(g) (2012) (codified as amended at Alaska Statute section
43.23.008 (d)-(e) (2014)).156 Mr. V., even though his absence from the state
tripled his initial presence in it, still received his 2006 PFD.157 The
justifications for the award are equitable, and among them are familial ties
to Alaska: the ALJ twice mentioned Mr. V.’s Alaskan relatives in passing,
the implication being that the presence of in-state relatives emits a
gathering, collecting influence over Mr. V.’s decision on where to retire
after his military service.158 Unlike Mr. M.’s case, which involved two
dividends, Mr. V.’s case involved five dividends, one for his wife and three
for his children, representing $5,534.80.159
Whereas the ALJ in Mr. M.’s case negatively emphasized how Mr.
M. chose a military career that placed the decision of where to reside largely
out of his control,160 the ALJ in Mr. V.’s case reasoned that, because
military service is an allowable absence by statute,161 the legislature could
not have intended to penalize military service members for their decision to
enter a career full of uncertainty and sudden change.162 While Mr. V. may
have received this leniency because of his personal affability, it is equally
likely that his personal affability, at least in part, was compelling because of
his familial ties to Alaska.
Three other facts favored Mr. V. First, had the five-year period
been slightly expanded at both ends, the trips Mr. V. took to Alaska in 2000
and 2006 would have removed him from the operation of the less-than-

152

V V, L V, R V, X V, and Y V, OAH No. 07-0104-PFD 1, 2 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue May 14,

2007).
153

Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 2.
155
Id. at 3.
156
Id. at 4.
157
Id. at 6. In 2007, Alaska’s legislature had not yet passed ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(c) (2012),
which creates a presumption that, after ten years of absence, Alaskan residency terminates. This
provision has since been repealed. See H.B. 52, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2013).
158
V V, L V, R V, X V, and Y V, OAH No. 07-0104-PFD at 3, 6.
159
Id. at 1; see Summary of Dividend Application & Payments, STATE OF ALASKA, DEP’T OF
REVENUE, PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND DIV., http://pfd.alaska.gov/DivisionInfo/SummaryApplications
Payments (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) [hereinafter PFD PAYMENT SUMMARY].
160
E. & W.M., OAH No. 09-0003-PFD 1, 5 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Mar. 26, 2009).
161
See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(a)(3) (2007).
162
V V, L V, R V, X V, and Y V, OAH No. 07-0104-PFD at 6 & n.21.
154
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thirty-days-in-five-years presumption.163 Second, unlike Mr. M., Mr. V.
served the military at a time when it still issued assignment preference lists;
both times Mr. V. received such a sheet, he indicated a desire to be reassigned to an army base in Alaska.164 Finally, Mr. V. bought land in
Alaska in 2004 on which to retire, envisioning a post-military career
employed as a civilian on an Alaskan military base.165
Because of the timing of his deployments, the ALJ in Mr. V.’s case
invoked a regulation that dispelled the thirty-days-in-five-years
presumption: “‘unavoidable circumstances’ prevented [Mr. V.] from
returning.”166 While many facts distinguish these two cases, one of them is
the presence of Mr. V.’s relatives in Alaska, which perhaps, to the eyes of
the ALJ, amplified the nature of Mr. V.’s residency in the state pre-absence
while solidifying his resolve to relocate there upon discharge from the
Army. The sort of affability or equity judicially ascribed to Mr. V. because
of his family’s bona fide Alaskan roots, which rescued him from PFD
ineligibility, is exactly the type of preferential treatment that Zobel derided
and which Alaska courts now guard against: “[i]t is this supposition that
living in territorial Alaska makes an individual entitled to special legal
stature that is impermissible.”167 Nonetheless, it is one thing to declare
something illegal because it is unconstitutional; it is quite another to alter a
fiercely proud and exclusionist mindset by judicial fiat.168
Consider the case of Mr. T., who also remained out of state with the
military for over five years while only returning for visits totaling seventeen
days.169 Despite falling well below the thirty-days-in-five-years threshold,
Mr. T.’s equity as an Alaskan – his long history within the state – weighed
163
Id. at 2. This presumption has since been codified as a bright-line rule. See discussion infra
Section III.A.2.
164
Compare id. at 5, with E. & W.M., OAH No. 09-0003-PFD at 4 (noting that the military no longer
uses an assignment preference list or “dream sheet”).
165
V V, L V, R V, X V, and Y V, OAH No. 07-0104-PFD at 3.
166
Id. at 4, quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.163(h)(2) (2010), repealed by H.B. 52, 28th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2013).
167
Schafer v. Vest, 680 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Alaska 1984).
168
See, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 169 (Alaska 1977), rev’d, 437 U.S. 518 (1978)
(upholding pipeline era legislation requiring that oil and gas jobs go first to Alaska residents: “[W]e do
not accept the offered conclusion that the government of Alaska can never make benefits available to
citizens of Alaska in preference to citizens of other states.”). In striking down the Alaska Hire Act at
issue in Hicklin because of its conflict with the constitution’s privileges and immunities clause, the
Supreme Court wrote, “[i]n sum, the Act is an attempt to force virtually all businesses that benefit in
some way from the economic ripple effect of Alaska’s decision to develop its oil and gas resources to
bias their employment practices in favor of the State’s residents.” Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531,
534 (1978). Only two years after the Alaska Hire Act failed to pass constitutional muster, the Alaska
Supreme Court upheld the original PFD program that distributed more money to long-time Alaskans than
to newcomers to the state. See Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448 (Alaska 1980), rev’d 457 U.S. 55. In
fact, Alaska’s preference for its own is ingrained in the state’s constitution. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 23
(“This constitution does not prohibit the State from granting preferences, on the basis of Alaska
residence, to residents of the State over nonresidents to the extent permitted by the Constitution of the
United States.”).
169
R.T. and his child C.T., OAH No. 05-0409-PFD 1, 1 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Nov. 18, 2005).
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in his favor. For instance, although Mr. T. became an adult resident of
Alaska in 1995, he began living there at the age of twelve,170 alternating
between his mother’s residence outside Alaska and his father’s home in
Alaska, a home which he helped his father construct and which his father
still owned.171
Like all the other military applicants discussed above, Mr. T.
maintained paper ties with Alaska and established no significant ties of
residency to any other state.172 Notably, Mr. T. owned a house and a
separate parcel of land in Alaska; he also proved he would inherit his
father’s house which he helped build.173 Furthermore, like Mr. V. above,
Mr. T. intended to return to Alaska in between tours of duty, but the military
cancelled his leave, allowing the ALJ to invoke the “unavoidable
circumstances” regulation, which in part rebutted the presumption of a
severed Alaskan residency that Mr. T.’s infrequent returns to the state over
his five-year absence created.174
Finally, in 2004 – the year for which he applied for a dividend – Mr.
T. had in fact already returned to the state, an act that confirmed his
erstwhile mere subjective intent to do so.175 Mr T.’s case “qualifie[d] as a
very rare exception to the rule” that a person who has revisited the state for
fewer than thirty days during a five-year absence is presumed to have
severed her residency.176 While the Alaska Supreme Court has grafted the
Supreme Court’s Zobel holding, which relied on the equal protection clause,
onto the state’s jurisprudence,177 ALJs can still interpret regulations in a
170
Id. In Alaska, a minor is a person under eighteen years of age. ALASKA STAT. § 13.06.050(29)
(2007). Therefore, it is safe to assume that Mr. T. had partially resided in Alaska for six years once he
turned eighteen. R.T. and his child C.T., OAH No. 05-0409-PFD at 1.
171
R.T. and his child C.T., OAH No. 05-0409-PFD at 1.
172
Id. at 2–3. In fact, Mr. T. was stationed at times in Guam and Italy, places the ALJ felt were
unlikely to seem like a “new home [to Mr. T.] while he lived there.” Id. at 3.
173
Id. at 2.
174
Id. at 3 (citing ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.163(h)(2) (2010), repealed by H.B. 52, 28th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2013)).
175
Id. at 3. Mr. T’s return visits to the state would only count if they occurred during a qualifying
year, meaning, in his case, one of the five years “immediately preceding January 1 of the current
dividend year.” See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(6) (2007). But the ALJ was still able to make Mr. T.’s
actual return to Alaska count towards his intent to remain in Alaska under ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15,
§ 23.163(g)(7) (2010) (“any other factors demonstrating the individual’s intent”). This particular
provision has been repealed and has no current statutory corollary. See H.B. 52, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Alaska 2013); ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(d)-(e) (2014).
176
R.T. and his child C.T., OAH No. 05-0409-PFD at 4.
177
See, e.g., Schafer v. Vest, 680 P.2d 1169, 1170–71 (Alaska 1984). In that case, the Alaska
Supreme Court struck down a longevity bonus enacted to compensate life-long Alaskans over 65 with
annual cash payments, reasoning that, like the original PFD program, it unconstitutionally “‘create[d]
fixed, permanent distinctions between . . . concededly bona fide residents, based on how long they have
been in the State.’” Id. (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 59 (1982)). The legislative purpose of
the longevity bonus was to protect “‘Alaskans who through their tenacity and perseverance molded
Alaska as we know it through skillful application of their talents.’” Schafer, 680 P.2d at 1170 n.4
(quoting ALASKA STAT. § 47.45.170 (repealed 1984)). Though ultimately unconstitutional, the stated
legislative purpose was eloquent and powerful: “These pioneers are the same Alaskans, who in the prime
of their life were in effect treated as second-class citizens by the federal government and who paid much
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manner that turns longstanding Alaskan residency into a dispositive factor
always weighing in favor of PFD eligibility.178
Yet another case demonstrates that an applicant’s strong preallowable absence connection to Alaska can overcome the thirty-days-infive-years presumption of severed residency and PFD ineligibility.179 Mr. R.
maintained paper ties to Alaska, did not establish strong ties to any other
state, but fell short of the thirty-day requirement by two days.180 However,
Mr. R., twenty-six years old at the time of the hearing, had lived in Alaska
since he was three, leaving only to pursue a career in the Air Force.181 The
ALJ distinguished Mr. R. from other military applicants who might merely
mention Alaska on their “dream sheets” to curry favor with the PFDD,
noting that when Mr. R. indicated a preference for an assignment to Alaska,
he did so to “be close to his family.”182 Although the ALJ could have
applied the “unavoidable circumstances” exception to Mr. R.’s failure to
meet the thirty-day threshold, the rule’s invocation was unnecessary: Mr. R.
credibly testified to his firm, plausible plan of returning to Alaska after his
military service.183 As a handler of explosive-sniffing dogs, Mr. R. earnestly
sought an assignment to an Air Force base outside of Anchorage, both to be
closer to his family and to further his career plan of becoming a K-9 officer
with the Anchorage Police Department.184 As in other close PFD eligibility
cases, Mr. R.’s upbringing in Alaska helped earn him a dividend by
evidencing his “intent at all times during [his] absence . . . to return to
Alaska and remain indefinitely in Alaska.”185
And, even if an applicant’s ties to Alaska seem paltry, his spouse’s
much more substantial connection to the state – one spanning thirty-five years
– will also tip the scales in favor of PFD eligibility.186 Mr. J., a major in the
Air Force, only returned to Alaska for thirteen days during the five years
immediately preceding the year for which he applied for a PFD, whereas

of their hard-earned income to a government in which they did not have the right to participate through
the power of the ballot. The legislature also is aware of the fact that many of these pioneers have been
forced to live out their retirement years in areas far away from the land they loved and nurtured and
thereby also suffering, in many cases, the loss of familial relationship with their own kin, an experience
that is sad and frustrating to them as well as depriving new generations of Alaskans of the benefits of
their wisdom and experience.” Id. The foregoing language was once part of an Alaska Statute.
178
See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15 § 23.163(g) (2010) (allowing PFD eligibility - “the intent to
return to Alaska and remain indefinitely” – to be calculated based upon “the time the individual spent in
Alaska before departing on the [allowable] absence.”) (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. §
43.23.008(e)(1) (2014)).
179
J.R., OAH No. 05-0299-PFD 1, 3 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Nov. 17, 2004).
180
Id. at 1, 3.
181
Id. at 1.
182
Id. at 3.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 1, 3.
185
See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.163(f) (2010) (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. §
43.23.008(e) (2014)).
186
D J and A G-J, OAH No. 12-0129-PFD 1, 8 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue July 23, 2012).
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during that same time, his wife returned for forty-three days.187 However, Mr.
J.’s wife’s eligibility hinged on her absence being allowable; as a military
spouse accompanying her husband out of state under military orders, she could
receive a PFD only if the ALJ determined her husband deserved one.188
Although Mr. J. had only been in the state from 1998-2001, during which time
he met and married his Alaskan wife, and even though his return trips fell well
below the required thirty days, the ALJ, while purporting not to, relied on Mr.
J.’s wife’s bona fide Alaska upbringing in deciding that Mr. J. (and therefore
his wife, too) deserved PFDs for the year in question.189 “M[r]. J does have
family ties in Alaska, as he has developed a close relationship with his wife’s
parents . . . . [T]he fact that his wife intends to return to Alaska is additional
evidence in support of finding that M[r]. J also intends to return.”190 While
there is perhaps no better way to gauge one’s intent to return to and remain
indefinitely in Alaska than by considering past residency and in-state familial
ties, this type of evaluation will always favor long-time residents over
newcomers who no less ardently wish to return to and remain in Alaska.
For example, consider the case of Mr. C., a member of the Air Force,
and his wife Mrs. C.191 Both Mr. and Mrs. C lived in Alaska during their
childhood.192 As with other applicants referenced in this section, because they
returned to Alaska for fewer than thirty days over the preceding five years,
they were faced with the presumption that they were no longer permanent
Alaska residents eligible for a PFD. Again, the ALJ noted that this was a rare
case – since the couple overcame the presumption – yet it is not so rare to find
the ALJ relying on the couple’s long history as Alaskans in his determination
to award PFDs: “[t]he Cs are long-time Alaskan residents, and given their
history of spending about two weeks every two years visiting with their
relatives in Alaska, it was probably Mr. C’s medical problems rather than a
waning interest in returning to Alaska” that permitted them to return for only
twenty-five days during the past five years.193
187
188
189

Id. at 2.
Id. at 7; see also ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(a)(3) (2014).
D J and A G-J, OAH No. 12-0129-PFD 1, 1–2, 8 & n.38 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue July 23,

2012).

190
Id. at 8. The ALJ was mindful that the residency of one’s spouse cannot be the principal factor in
determining PFD eligibility. See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.015(a) (2007). However, the ALJ stated that
Ms. J’s residency was “not the principal factor, but . . . an additional factor relied on to tip the balance in
M[r]. J’[s] favor.” D J and A G-J, OAH No. 12-0129-PFD at 8 n.38; see also P.T., OAH No. 10-0386PFD 1, 3 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Oct. 4, 2010) (finding a military service member eligible for a
dividend because his marriage to an Alaskan solidified his residency, permitting him to be allowably
absent overseas, and stating: “It can hardly be doubted that a person who lives in Alaska, has married a
firmly-rooted Alaskan, and has just adopted three Alaska children has shown strong evidence of being
‘physically present in the state with the intent to remain indefinitely.’”).
191
A & J C and their child, A, OAH No. 11-0287-PFD 1, 1 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Sept. 14,
2011).
192
Id.
193
Id. at 5; see also T and E C, individually and ex rel. H M and G C, OAH No. 11-0404-PFD 1, 4
n.29–30 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Mar. 23, 2012) (compiling cases considering the thirty-days-in-fiveyears presumption). T and E C concerned a thirty-nine year old Inupiat woman who joined the Air Force
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But the benefits of an Alaskan upbringing only go so far in securing
a long-absent resident his PFD. Consider the case of Mr. J.M., who left the
state in 1993 to pursue a career in the Air Force, applied for a 2004 PFD, but
did not anticipate returning to Alaska to retire until 2014.194 While the ALJ
gave “particular weight to the fact that [Mr. J.M.] is from Alaska and was
raised in this state, and that many of his relatives still live in Alaska,” the
ALJ ruled that Mr. J.M., who had only returned for twenty-three days during
his five-year absence, did not rebut the presumption that he no longer
intended to return to Alaska and remain there indefinitely.195 Even though
the Air Force allowed Mr. J.M. thirty days of leave per year, he rarely used
that time to return to Alaska, but instead spent it with his wife and schoolage children on base in South Carolina.196 Essentially, Mr. J.M. built a life
outside of Alaska, an endeavor that cut off his PFD eligibility.197
However, there appears to be a trump card as powerful as a bona
fide, pre-absence Alaskan residency.198 If an individual, after the qualifying
years in question, actually does return to and settle in Alaska, then her
subjective intent, shaky when analyzed under the other thirty-days-in-fiveyears factors, reasserts itself as an accomplished fact that weighs strongly in
favor of PFD eligibility.199 For instance, A.R., a military service member
similar to the others in this Section but with only weak ties to Alaska,
managed to return to the state for just eleven days during the five-year
period in question.200 But, when he sought review at the informal appeals
level, he was already a party to an executory contract to purchase a house in
Alaska, and the deal closed before the formal appeal commenced.201 The
ALJ found that the tricky problem of gauging “something as ethereal as a
person’s probable subjective intent” could be bypassed by A.R.’s recent
purchase of an Alaskan home.202 The ALJ found this fact outweighed all
other factors – even the presumption of ineligibility created by the mere
eleven days spent in Alaska over the five-year absence – and granted a PFD

and had returned to Alaska for only twenty-six days in the five years preceding her PFD application but
was granted a PFD in part because eleven years of her life were spent in Alaska at various times, and in
part because “she was born in the state and has a large number of close and extended family members
there, and that, as an Alaska Native, she has cultural ties to Alaska that cannot be replicated elsewhere,”
all of which verified her intent to return to Alaska upon retirement from the Air Force. Id. at 1–2, 10.
194
J.M. and his child B.M., OAH No. 05-0297-PFD 1, 1 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Nov. 17, 2004).
195
Id. at 1, 3–4. This presumption has since been codified as a bright-line rule. See discussion infra
Section III.A.2.
196
Id. at 1.
197
Id. at 3.
198
See M & A.R., OAH No. 06-0228-PFD 1, 2–4 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Aug. 25, 2006)
(granting a PFD when the applicant, despite returning to the state for only eleven days during his fiveyear allowable absence, actually did return to the state).
199
Id. at 3.
200
Id. at 2.
201
Id. at 1, 3.
202
Id. at 3.
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in this rare instance.203
2. The Legislature Codifies a Faulty Administrative Code
As the administrative hearings illustrated above plainly show, the
best way to rebut the administratively created presumption of ineligibility
after a long absence from the state with few return trips is to tout the depth
of your ties to the state – show that you married an Alaskan, show that you
grew up there, or show that your family still lives there – in hopes of
persuading an ALJ who may legally scrutinize this factor in determining
your eligibility.
However, these hearings not only dabble in the realm of the
speculative and hypothetical by adjudging something as necessarily
unverifiable as someone’s subjective intent to return to Alaska, but also
emphasize the factor of one’s equity as an Alaskan in contravention of
Zobel’s main holding: length of residency as a proxy for past contributions
to the state cannot be disproportionately compensated to the detriment of
newcomers who no less earnestly wish to remain in Alaska indefinitely.204
Rather than reject the favoritism ALJs bestowed on long-time
Alaskans seeking PFDs, the Alaska Legislature codified the administrative
code containing the thirty-days-in-five-years presumption, which became
effective June 4, 2013.205 It appears that ALJs have less discretion under the
statute than they did under the administrative code. As the statute now reads,
the presumption may be rebutted by “convincing evidence . . . that the
individual was physically present in the state for at least 30 cumulative days
during the past five years.”206 By contrast, the old language in the regulation
stated that “the department will generally consider that an individual who has
not been physically present in Alaska for at least 30 cumulative days during the
past five years has not rebutted the presumption.”207 However, the statute’s
legislative history sends mixed signals despite the statute’s clear wording and,
even if the thirty-days-in-five-years presumption has been elevated to the status
of a bright-line rule, any applicant who crosses its threshold will still be
subjected to an equitable balancing test involving many factors,208 the thrust of
which favors long-time Alaska residents over newcomers.209
203
Id. at 3–4. The ALJ classified the purchase of the house under the catch-all provision of the
seventh factor: any “‘other factors demonstrating the individual’s intent.’” Id. (quoting ALASKA ADMIN.
CODE tit. 15, § 23.163(g)(7) (2010), repealed by H.B. 52, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2013)).
204
See discussion supra Section II.A.
205
See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(d)(e) (2014).
206
Id. § 43.23.008(d)(1) (2014).
207
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15 § 23.163(h)(2) (2010) (emphasis added) (codified as amended at
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008 (d)(1) (2014)).
208
See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(e) (2014).
209
See id. § 43.23.008(e)(1). This factor conditions an applicant’s subjective intent “to return and
remain in the state indefinitely,” which has always been a prerequisite to PFD eligibility governed by
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(7) (2014), on “the length of time the individual was absent from the state
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The statute’s legislative history indicates that the PFDD
“envision[ed] a scoring system . . . in determining a person’s intent to return
to Alaska,”210 which would presumably be based on the factors set forth by
Alaska Statute § 43.23.008(e) (2014). But the PFD distribution scheme
struck down by Zobel had a scoring system too: each year of residency in
the state since 1959 entitled an applicant to $50, which would have allowed
long-time residents to receive a PFD twenty-one times larger than a resident
who had only been in Alaska one year.211 While the PFD distribution
scheme is now a zero-sum proposition – you either get one or you do not –
disproportionately weighting the factor of long-time residency in the
‘subjective-intent-to-remain-score’ envisioned by the PFDD could have the
effect of dividing Alaska’s population into permanent classes. On the one
hand, long-time residents who travel for over five years can still obtain
dividends because of their equity as Alaskans, while on the other hand,
newcomers who otherwise satisfy every PFD eligibility requirement but
who only recently decided to build a life in Alaska before travelling
elsewhere for over five years can obtain no dividends. And, as Zobel made
clear, “‘favoring established residents over new residents’ is constitutionally
unacceptable” under federal equal protection jurisprudence.212
Furthermore, the legislative history behind the codification of the
administrative code suggests that the legislature, or at least the bill’s
sponsor, who persuaded the legislature to enact it, agreed with the decisions
arrived at by the ALJs under the old regulation and in fact wanted to further
protect the coddling of long-time Alaskans at the heart of many of those
decisions. “Putting the [administrative] provision in statute would make it
easier for the division to deny applications that might not be valid and have
that decision upheld through the administrative appeals process.”213 And
when Dan DeBartolo, the current director of the PFDD, spoke on the Senate
floor, his understanding of the proposed legislation seemed to miss the point
that the statute would turn the thirty-days-in-five-years factor into its own
necessary element that an applicant must meet before the factors analyzing
subjective intent apply: “[n]ow the rule says if a person does not return to
the state, cumulatively, for 30 days over a five-year period, that person will

compared to the length of time the individual was physically present in the state.” See id; see also
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(n.7) (2007).
210
Allowable Absence: Hearing on H.B. 52 Before the House Comm. on State Affairs, 2013 Leg.,
28th Sess. (2013) (statement of Michael Paschall, Staff for Rep. Eric Feige, bill sponsor),
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?ch=H&beg_line=00448&end_line=00518&sess
ion=28&comm=STA&date=20130129&time=0804).
211
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 57 (1982).
212
Id. at 65 (quoting Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 450 (1973)).
213
Allowable Absence: Hearing on H.B. 52 Before the Senate Comm. on State Affairs, 2013 Leg.,
28th Sess. (2013) (statement of Michael Paschall, Staff for Rep. Eric Feige, bill sponsor),
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?ch=S&beg_line=00350&end_line=00589&sess
ion=28&comm=STA&date=20130319&time=0902.
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have to go through the process to show strong ties to the state.”214 The
statute actually states:
After an individual has been absent from the state for more
than 180 days in each of the five preceding qualifying years,
the department shall presume that the individual is no
longer a state resident. The individual may rebut this
presumption by providing clear and convincing evidence to
the department that (1) the individual was physically present
in the state for at least 30 cumulative days during the past
five years; and (2) the individual is a state resident as
defined in AS 43.23.095.215
However, what is more troubling than the Director’s possible
misunderstanding of the new statute is how the statute’s sponsor described
the new objective test he hoped the PFDD would adopt to determine
eligibility for PFDs under the second prong of the test, intent to return to
Alaska and remain there indefinitely:216
The length of time the individual is absent from the state
compared to the length of time the individual is physically
present in the state. With this being in statute the [PFDD]
felt that they would be able to develop a scoring criteria and
use an example for, a possibility of say someone who is in
the state for two years and then they are absent for five,
they’re in their sixth year, they didn’t really establish strong
ties to Alaska, so that would count against them versus
someone say that was born in Alaska and was in Alaska for
18 years [and] went off to school or went off into the
military, and now is in their sixth year, they’ve been absent
a much less period of time in comparison to the length of
time they’ve been [in Alaska], so that the [PFDD] would be
able to hopefully develop a more objective scale instead of a

214

Allowable Absence: Hearing on H.B. 52 Before the Senate Comm. on State Affairs, 2013 Leg.,
28th Sess. (2013) (statement of Dan Debartolo, Director of the Permanent Fund Dividend Division, Dep’t
of Revenue), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?ch=S&beg_line=00350&end_
line=00589&session=28&comm=STA&date=20130319&time=0902.
Of course, the Commissioner could have been speaking about an earlier version of the Bill. The audio
transcript records exactly what the Commissioner said: “Now the rule says basically very bright line that
if you do not return to the state of Alaska cumulatively for thirty days over a five year period, that is the
first criteria we are going to apply, and we are going to say you’ve severed your residency ties. At that
point, in order to get the dividend, you’re going to have to go through the same process as when you first
came to Alaska, essentially at least spend 6 months within the state and continue to show those strong
residency ties to the state as [the bill sponsor’s staffer, Mr. Paschall] mentioned.” Id. (click on play
button to Senate minutes) (scroll to time period 9:51:19 AM to 9:51:51 AM).
215
ALASKA STAT. §43.23.008(d) (2014).
216
Id. § 42.23.095(n.7) (2007).
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subjective use of every reviewer’s process to go through.217
Two and a half weeks later, testifying before the Senate Finance
Committee, Mr. Paschall reiterated his conception of the scoring system that
the PFDD would implement:
An applicant that was out of state for five years so now
applying for the sixth year and they were in the state for
three years, and then they moved or transferred to
somewhere else, and I think you can identify what scenario
that person is in, versus an individual that had been in
Alaska say for, 18 years, or 19 years, and left the state and
is now entering their sixth year, and in this case both of
those individuals are in the military, which one has more of
an intent to return to the state than the other one, and it’s
clearly the individual that was here for the 18 years during
their youth, and [the PFDD] would be able to score that as a
higher [score] based upon time in the state versus time out
of the state.218
And, what is more, the current PFDD Director testified that he
currently had score sheets in place, presumably ready to mathematically
ascertain with complete and objective certainty an applicant’s subjective
intent to return to Alaska, a score sheet which must, in order to accomplish
this task, treat long-time Alaska residency as a proxy for intent to return to
the State, which unfairly prejudices newcomers to Alaska and defies the
spirit of Zobel:
So we do have criteria score sheets in place right now.
We’ve been looking at this, but the nice thing about it going
into statute is we can first look at that thirty day return
requirement and if you have no other criteria beyond that
for us to look at, we can say you are simply denied until you

217
Allowable Absence: Hearing on H.B. 52 Before the Senate Comm. on State Affairs, 2013 Leg.,
28th Sess. (2013) (statement of Michael Paschall, staff to Eric Feige, bill sponsor),
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?ch=S&beg_line=00350&end_line=00589&sess
ion=28&comm=STA&date=20130319&time=0902 (click on play button to Senate minutes) (scroll to
time period 9:44:22 AM to 9:45:13 AM). The “reviewer’s process” Mr. Paschall mentions likely refers
to the discretion ALJs had under the old administrative code to award a PFD to an applicant who had not
returned to Alaska for over 30 days in the past five years based on the subjective intent factors. See
discussion supra Section III.A.1. Now, the thirty-days-in-five-years presumption has morphed into a
bright-line rule, but after it has been met, the applicant must still prove subjective intent under the second
prong of the test, which balances the old familiar factors from the administrative code. See supra text
accompanying notes 132–40.
218
Hearing on H.B. 52 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 2013 Leg., 28th Sess. (2013) (statement
of
Michael
Paschall,
staff
to
Eric
Feige,
bill
sponsor),
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?ch=S&beg_line=00342&end_line=00627&sess
ion=28&comm=FIN&date=20130405&time=0912 (emphasis added) (click on play button to Senate
minutes) (scroll to time period 10:03:32 AM to 10:04:10 AM).
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reestablish with the state of Alaska the residency ties.219
The point remains to be made that, whether a statute blatantly and
transparently confers a benefit on some Alaska residents based on their
length of residency,220 or whether it smuggles this factor into an
administrative equation that favors granting long-time residents their PFDs
more often than newcomers, the law still draws invidious distinctions
between Alaska residents based on their length of residency. The statute,
then, leaves itself open to an equal protection claim, brought on behalf of the
newcomer in either of Mr. Paschall’s hypotheticals above who, especially if
the newcomer does return to Alaska after her five year absence, will have a
very strong argument that she was denied equal protection of the law if her
applications for PFDs during those years were denied.
3. Exorcising Zobel’s Ghost from the Thirty-Days-in-Five-Years
Presumption
The basic goals of the PFD program state that it should: (1)
equitably distribute the state’s wealth to Alaskans; (2) reduce population
turnover; and (3) increase democratic involvement in the fund.221
Additionally, Alaska courts recognize ease of administering the PFD
program and the prevention of fraud as equally legitimate purposes served
by how the PFD is currently allocated.222 In light of these objectives, the
Alaska legislature should re-amend the thirty-days-in-five-years test by
stripping it of its most incongruous and politically-fraught factor: “the
length of time the individual was absent from the state compared to the
length of time the individual was physically present in the state.”223 Under
this new balancing test, once an applicant has shown that she has returned to
the state for at least thirty days within the past five years, she would be
barred from making arguments that her impressive length of residency or
her extensive family ties to the state automatically make her more likely
than a similarly situated newcomer to return to Alaska and put down roots.
ALJs should be able to take a newcomer’s intent to return to Alaska and
start a life there at face value, just as they do in any case involving a longtime Alaska resident who has also been outside of Alaska for over five
years.

219

Hearing on H.B. 52 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 2013 Leg., 28th Sess. (2013) (statement
of Dan Debartolo, Director of the Permanent Fund Dividend Division, Dep’t of Natural Resources),
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?ch=S&beg_line=00342&end_lin
e=00627&session=28&comm=FIN&date=20130405&time=0912 (click on play button to Senate
minutes) (scroll to time period 10:11:08 AM to 10:11:28 AM).
220
See discussion supra Section II.A.
221
Ross v. State, 292 P.3d 906, 910 (Alaska 2012) (citations omitted), superseded by statute,
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008 (2013).
222
Id. at 911.
223
See ALASKA STAT. §43.23.008(e)(1) (2014).
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An applicant’s length of residency as a proxy for her intent to return
to Alaska makes scant sense in a state with such a fluid population. “Alaska
has among the highest rates of migration turnover in the nation. Even
without migration of the seasonal workforce, Alaska had the second-highest
rate of gross migration (in-migration plus out-migration, divided by total
population) in the nation for 2009 to 2010 (the latest data available), at 14.5
percent.”224 The bygone era of us versus them, of sourdoughs versus
cheechakos,225 has long since passed. Now “[t]he majority of people living
in Alaska are migrants to the state . . . . [O]nly 39.1 percent of Alaskans
were born here.”226 In its most populous cities, the percentage of people
born in Alaska declines slightly: “33.6 percent for Anchorage [and] 32.2
percent for Fairbanks North Star Borough.”227 And the people that Alaska is
best at attracting, the people aged 25 to 34 who raise families and form
households,228 are precisely the ones whose efforts Alaska should reward
with PFDs, whether or not they leave the state for over five years while
serving in the military or obtaining a degree. Ridding the statute of its past
residency factor229 would help to dispel the notion – built up through
administrative hearings – that someone with stronger ties to the state is more
deserving of a PFD than a newcomer to the state when both applicants, in
fact, may have the same desire to build a life in Alaska.
This rule change would better fulfill another core purpose of the
PFD program: “‘to provide a mechanism for equitable distribution . . . of the
state’s energy wealth’” to the people of Alaska.230 Alaska is no longer an
insular group of independent souls facing swarms of outsiders bent on
finding work on the pipeline, as it was when the first PFD distribution
scheme emerged.231 Alaska should no longer fear newcomers, but should
regard them as an economic boon to the state, a resource worthy of PFD
investment.
Alaska’s legislature should have retained one defense to ineligibility
in the context of five-year absences: the provision in the administrative code
224
Alaska Population Overview, 2012 Estimates, ALASKA DEP’T OF LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV. 1,
11 (2013), http://labor.alaska.gov/research/pop/estimates/pub/popover.pdf. [hereinafter POPULATION
OVERVIEW].
225
Alaska Lingo: The Wild Slang of Anchorage & Alaska, THE OFFICIAL SOURCE FOR ANCHORAGE,
ALASKA TRAVEL INFORMATION, http://www.anchorage.net/Anchorage-Alaska-lingo-terminology (last
visited Nov. 26, 2014) (defining these two terms as newcomer and long-time Alaskan respectively).
226
POPULATION OVERVIEW, supra note 224, at 11.
227
Id.
228
Id. at 12 (stating that Alaska typically has strong net migration gains of people ages 25 to 34).
229
See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(e)(1) (2014).
230
Ross v. State, 292 P.3d 906, 910 (Alaska 2012), superseded by statute, ALASKA STAT. §
43.23.008 (2013), (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61 & n.7 (1982) (quoting 1980 Alaska Sess.
Laws, ch. 21, § 1(b) (repealed 1982))).
231
See POPULATION OVERVIEW, supra note 224, at 9. During the busiest year of the pipeline’s
construction, 1974 to 1975, 30,000 people came to Alaska; between 1980 and 1985, when the pipeline
began producing and oil prices remained high, Alaska was “the fastest-growing state in the nation,”
increasing its population “nearly 30 percent in those five years.” Id.
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for “unavoidable circumstances.”232 Against the bright-line thirty-day rule,
this defense would provide that ineligibility “does not apply if the individual
shows to the department's satisfaction that unavoidable circumstances
prevented that individual from returning for at least 30 cumulative days
during the past five years.”233 A PFD applicant who cannot meet the first
prong of the test because she has not returned to Alaska for at least thirty
days within the past five years234 should be able to assert unavoidable
circumstances as an affirmative defense:
Unavoidable circumstances have been found to exist where
the ability to return to Alaska was beyond an applicants
[sic] control such as deployment overseas with no
opportunity for leave. An “unavoidable circumstance” is
something more than having to choose between two
options; it is a force precluding an applicant from even
having the option to choose.235
Something that only makes it “‘impractical’ to return more often” or
“extremely expensive and inconvenient” to do so does not show “that
unavoidable circumstances prevented . . . more frequent returns.”236 The
unavoidable circumstances exception should survive because it has
historically protected Alaska service members engaged in combat
overseas.237 Against this backdrop, it is likely that other unavoidable
circumstances exceptions will require equally compelling scenarios.
Furthermore, the complex administrative rules that have sprouted up
around the concept of eligibility have become so intricately self-referential
as to be unintelligible to the average Alaskan (including this Comment’s
author, who was continually surprised by the outcome of the administrative
hearings even after reading scores of them). Therefore, the deletion of the
past residency factor from the statutory balancing test – which has done
nothing but present a blank canvas on which ALJs are wont to paint a
masterpiece of the loyal Alaskan equitably getting his just deserts – would
simplify the PFD eligibility process by engineering the histrionics out of it.
Moreover, the very density of the rules themselves creates an argument that
the PFD program has stopped fulfilling one of its basic purposes: “to
increase citizen involvement in the management of the permanent fund.”238
The system may be too opaque for the average Alaskan to interact with
232
See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.163(h)(2) (2010), repealed by H.B. 52, 28th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Alaska 2013).
233
See id.
234
ALASKA STAT. §43.23.008(d)(1) (2014).
235
K. A. P., OAH No. 09-0274-PFD 1, 4 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Nov. 17, 2009).
236
Id. at 4–5 (citing S. H. et al., OAH No. 030093-PFD (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue, 2003)).
237
See id. (collecting cases).
238
See Ross v. State, 292 P.3d 906, 911 (Alaska 2012), superseded by statute, ALASKA STAT. §
43.23.008 (2013).
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meaningfully. In fact, Alaska state legislators, in an attempt to repeal a
section of PFD law that cut off eligibility for those absent longer than ten
years (unless they were absent less than 180 days from Alaska on the
dividend year for which they apply),239 almost enacted a bill that would have
given “dividends to people who have never visited Alaska,”240 due to their
failure to carefully read the interacting statutes and administrative codes on
PFD eligibility. If our own elected representatives, presumably chosen at
least in part for their familiarity with and expertise in the lawmaking
process, could have so dramatically misread the PFD rules and statutes, then
what chance does an everyday Alaskan have at making sense out of what it
is, exactly, that she must do to become eligible for a PFD?
In reaction to all the allowable absences and presumptions, one
longtime Fairbanks opinion columnist suggests that “[i]f you live in Alaska
at least six months a year, you get a dividend. If you aren’t in Alaska six
months a year, you don’t,” noting that his proposal would banish the
decisive but unfortunately clairvoyant inquiry of “whether someone who
lives Outside really intends to return to Alaska.”241 Of course, this solution
would be simpler to administer, but it would also do away with many
reasonable exceptions that have been created over the years. Alaska
residents who chose to become armed service members should not be
punished for that choice. Similarly, any Alaska resident who wishes to
become a doctor or lawyer must travel out of state to do so: there are no
schools of medicine or law in Alaska.242 Keep this tension between ease of
administration and accommodation for genuinely meritorious absences in
mind. An alternative solution to improve the PFD program – one that goes
beyond just eliminating the past-residency factor while adding an
unavoidable circumstances defense – will be examined after the next
subsection of selected administrative hearings.

239
See H.B. 52, 28th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2013); see also discussion supra Section II.D.3
(explaining how ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(c) (2012), repealed by H.B. 52, 28th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Alaska 2013) constitutionally denied a PFD to Mr. Ross, a long absent Alaska resident and marine).
240
Dermot Cole, State House nearly approves bill to extend Permanent Fund Dividends to some who
have
never
lived
in
Alaska,
NEWSMINER.COM
(last
updated
Feb.
2,
2013),
http://m.newsminer.com/blogs/staff_blogs/state-house-nearly-approves-bill-to-extend-permanent-funddividends/article_a52ae99e-6d74-11e2-8555-001a4bcf6878.html?mode=jqm (noting that a vigilant
representative realized “that dependents who had never been to Alaska could get dividends for up to 18
years if one of their parents had an allowable absence extending over a period of many years . . . . [I]t
would be hard to classify someone who has never visited Alaska as a resident.”).
241
Id.; see also Alaska Lingo: The Wild Slang of Anchorage & Alaska, THE OFFICIAL SOURCE FOR
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA TRAVEL INFORMATION, http://www.anchorage.net/Anchorage-Alaska-lingoterminology (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (“Outside – any place not in Alaska.”).
242
See Christopher Eshleman, Alaska Rep. Scott Kawasaki pitches law, med schools,
NEWSMINER.COM
(last
updated
Dec.
26,
2012),
http://www.newsminer.com/news/alaska_news/article_6dfc4b94-5510-573e-94b7-7694c6fe55db.html;
Martha Neil, The Only State Without a Law School, Alaska Needs One, Lawmaker Says, ABA JOURNAL
(Dec. 28, 2010, 11:18 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/the_only_state_without_a_law_
school_alaska_needs_one_lawmaker_says/.
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B. Maintaining a Principal Home Outside of Alaska
Because Zobel held that Alaska’s PFD program could no longer
disburse more of the fund to long-time residents than to recently minted
ones, but because the program is still geared toward encouraging residents
to remain in the state through its financial incentive, one might expect more
decisions granting newcomers dividends based on the acceptance of their
sworn intent to remain in Alaska.243 However, perhaps because fewer
newcomers apply for PFDs and even fewer appeal their denials,244 the
outcomes of most administrative hearings echo the reasoning debunked in
Zobel by insisting that past residency best validates an applicant’s intent to
return to the state and remain indefinitely, thus ensuring that the longer an
individual has resided in Alaska, the more likely she is to receive her yearly
PFD.
The administrative hearings below all consider the issue of whether
a PFD applicant has established residency before claiming a PFD. As a
general rule, “[a]n individual’s intent to establish residency, remain
indefinitely in Alaska, or to return to Alaska and remain indefinitely is
demonstrated through the establishment and maintenance of customary ties
indicative of Alaska residency and the absence of those ties elsewhere.”245
Real evidence of ties to Alaska must be established at least six months prior
to the qualifying year,246 meaning the year that counts for PFD purposes and
that immediately precedes the year in which one applies for a PFD.247 A
243
See discussion supra Section II.A. “The separation of residents into classes hardly seems a likely
way to persuade new Alaskans that the State welcomes them and wants them to stay.” Zobel v. Williams,
457 U.S. 55, 62 n.9 (1982).
244
Newcomers may appeal their cases less frequently or may be less knowledgeable about the PFD
program than more seasoned Alaskans. It is not as though the PFDD advertises the dividend’s
availability. See PFD FAQ’S, supra note 123 (click on “Applying for a Dividend” then click on “How do
I get an application booklet? I did not receive one in the mail.”) (stating that “[a]pplicants can apply
online, or visit one of the designated distribution centers to pick up forms and an informative pamphlet
for first time filers.”).
245
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15 § 23.143(a) (2013).
246
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15 § 23.143(c). This administrative code stems from the statutory
requirement that an applicant claiming certain allowable absences be “a resident of the state for at least
six consecutive months immediately before leaving the state.” ALASKA STAT. §43.23.008(b) (2014).
This six month requirement applies to every allowable absence except an absence “for any reason
consistent with the individual’s intent to remain a state resident,” so long as she returns within 180, 120,
or 45 days, as the case may be. Id. § 43.23.008(a)(17), (b) (implying mysteriously that other allowable
absences, such as getting an education or serving in the Army, are inconsistent with the intent to remain
an Alaskan resident). Although it seems logical that being a resident for at least six months means
residing in the state and intending to remain there, and while it also seems logical that, once residency is
so established, a resident remains so even if she leaves Alaska but intends to return (see ALASKA STAT. §
01.10.055 (2007)), the Alaska Supreme Court has held that the six month time period in ALASKA STAT.
§43.23.008(b) (2014) means that “[i]n order to claim the [allowable] absence, the PFD applicant must
have first demonstrated a bona fide intent to remain in Alaska by physically residing in the state for six
consecutive months.” Heller v. Dep’t of Revenue, 314 P.3d 69, 76–77 (Alaska 2013). But see id.
(Winfree, J., dissenting) (stating that “[a] consecutive six-month physical presence requirement for an
allowable absence, which necessarily implies continuous physical presence, will come as a great surprise
to the many [Alaskan] high school graduates who take an out-of-state spring break or summer vacation
before departing for a college outside Alaska.”).
247
See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(6) (2014).
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veritable barrage of disqualifying actions can dissolve any customary ties an
applicant has built up, chief among which is the maintenance of a principal
home anywhere but Alaska during the qualifying year, “regardless of
whether the individual spent a majority of time at that home,” unless the
individual was allowably absent under certain sections of Alaska Statute
section 43.23.008 (2014).248 With sixteen disqualifying acts at their
disposal,249 ALJs rarely award PFDs to fledgling Alaskans. By contrast, the
first case in the next subsection gives the benefit of the doubt to the new and
curious.
1. Selected Administrative Hearings
Toward the end of 2007, an Ohio couple, Mr. E. and Ms. V.,
resolved to make a new start in Alaska after the oil conglomerate BP offered
Mr. E. a job in Anchorage.250 The couple traveled to Anchorage in
December 2007, but Ms. V. returned to Ohio later that month to sell her
home and to give her employer there her two-week notice.251 She returned
to Anchorage in January 2008, but was denied her 2009 PFD on the grounds
that she had not established residency throughout the entirety of 2008, the
qualifying year.252 The PFDD argued that she had not established
“customary ties indicative of Alaska residency,”253 but the ALJ rejected such
a formulaic approach to the regulation at issue, placing the primary
emphasis instead on Ms. V.’s intent during her December, 2007 visit to
Anchorage, Alaska:
There is no published list of “customary ties,” nor is it clear
whose customs are to be considered. Alaska is known for
colorful individualists who never establish what some
people would consider “customary ties” of residency, yet
have lived here all their lives with no intent to leave.254
Instead, the ALJ determined Ms. V.’s mind was resolved in
December that Anchorage would be her new principal home, making her
house for sale back in Ohio and her job there “temporary obligations” that
posed no impediment to Ms. V. receiving her first PFD.255
Few decisions deal with newcomers with such a sympathetic,

248

ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15 § 23.143(d)(1) (2013).
See id. §23.143(d)(1)–(15), (17), (h).
250
M.V., OAH No. 09-0599-PFD 1, 1 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue March 11, 2010).
251
Id.
252
See id.; see also ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(a)(3) (2014) (stating that “[a]n individual is eligible
to receive one permanent fund dividend each year . . . if the individual . . . was a state resident during the
entire qualifying year.”).
253
M.V., OAH No. 09-0599-PFD 1 at 2 (citing ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.143(a) (2013)).
254
Id. at 2–3.
255
Id. at 3.
249
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straightforward application of the law.256 Instead, most of the cases use a
well-established Alaskan pedigree as evidence weighing heavily in favor of
a PFD. Consider the case of Ms. O., who moved to Alaska in 1984,
established a business three years later, and then bought a house with her
husband.257 Ms. O. accompanied her children to New Jersey from 20002001, where they attended school, making her ineligible for those years’
dividends because of absences over 180 days.258 However, in 2006, Ms. O.
traded her New Jersey driver’s license for an Alaska one and reregistered to
vote in Alaska before she applied for the 2007 PFD,259 but the PFDD denied
her application, claiming that she was no longer an Alaska resident or that,
even if she were, she had maintained her principal home in New Jersey
during the qualifying year, thus depriving herself of that year’s dividend.260
The ALJ disagreed and found that, despite her lengthy visits to New Jersey,
Ms. O. had in fact returned to Alaska each summer – therefore, “because her
husband, her business and her purchased home were all in Alaska, it [was]
more likely than not that Ms. O. maintained her principal home in Alaska
even though she did not spend a majority of her time in Alaska.”261 Ms. O.,
who had a twenty-three year history with Alaska, was awarded her 2007
PFD.262
Or consider the case of Ms. H., whose daughter, J., was severely
injured in a car accident and had to be airlifted to a hospital in Washington
state in September 2007.263 Ms. H. had lived in Alaska since the age of
three, and her daughter was a life-long resident.264 However, the PFDD
denied them their 2008 PFDs on the grounds that they had established a
256
See, e.g., Underwood v. State, 881 P.2d 322, 327–28 (Alaska 1994) (denying dividends to a
family of three from Texas who planned their move to be eligible for PFDs because the legislature
shifted the date from which residency must be proven from April 1 to January 1 after the family arrived
in Alaska on March 25); L.S. and her minor child J.S., OAH No. 06-0772-PFD 1, 1–3 (Alaska Dep’t of
Revenue June 26, 2006) (denying 2005 PFDs to a mother and her child who had only resided in the state
for about a year before leaving in December 2004 to care for an ailing relative because the mother could
show no substantial ties to Alaska, lied on her 2005 application that she was physically present in Alaska
at that time, and did not intend to return until August of 2007); G.G., OAH No. 07-0043-PFD 1, 1–2
(Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Aug. 14, 2007) (denying 2006 PFDs to a mother who arrived in Alaska with
her child in October 2004, left their apartment in November 2005, claimed without any documentation
that they then lived in an Alaskan hotel until May 2006, when they moved to Illinois and filed PFD
applications because Mrs. G.’s intent to return to Alaska was conditioned upon her winning the lottery).
257
S.O., OAH No. 08-0480-PFD 1, 1 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Mar. 13, 2009).
258
Id. at 1–2. For reasons not preserved on record, but in part because Ms. O did not reply to the
PFDD’s requests for additional information, she also did not receive dividends for 2005-2006. Id. at 2.
259
Id. at 2.
260
Id.
261
Id. at 6. The administrative code at issue reads as follows: “An individual is not eligible for a
dividend if, at any time from January 1 of the qualifying year through the date of application, the
individual has maintained the individual's principal home in another state or country, regardless of
whether the individual spent a majority of time at that home . . . .” ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, §
23.143(d)(1) (2013). The code seemingly contemplates a disqualifying principal home, but in this case
the low threshold for disqualification has been inverted to benefit an oft-absent, but compellingly
Alaskan, applicant. S.O., OAH No. 08-0480-PFD at 1.
262
Id. at 1.
263
J.H. and S. & N.J., OAH No. 09-0399-PFD 1, 1 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Oct. 27, 2009).
264
Id.
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principal residence in Seattle, even though J. was then at a hospital in San
Diego where doctors had recommended she convalesce while Ms. H. rented
a nearby house.265 Although their absence was indeterminate, the ALJ ruled
that because Ms. H. had left her retirement fund as a state employee intact,
she had a credible and very real financial incentive to return to the state in
order to vest.266 Regardless of the fact that both applicants were in San
Diego at the time of the hearing, the ALJ was persuaded by their testimony
that they planned to return to Alaska as soon as J. was better; the mother and
daughter had only done what any ordinary Alaskan – whose in-state medical
facilities can only cure so much – would have done, and so each was eligible
for 2008 PFDs.267
In another case in which the ALJ had to resolve a “close question,”
long-time Alaskan residency seemed to be the dispositive factor.268 Mr. and
Mrs. M., full-time residents since 1963, had received every dividend since
the program’s inception.269 However, the PFDD denied them their 2011
PFDs because they sold one of their Alaskan homes in February 2011 after
buying a home in Arizona in November 2010 – an out of state home the
PFDD alleged became the couple’s principal home.270 Mr. and Mrs. M.’s
absences were less than 180 days.271 Furthermore, interpreting the principal
home regulation, the ALJ noted that “an applicant is not required to have a
principal home, and may have no principal home, but still remain an Alaska
resident for PFD purposes”; rather, the regulation simply forbids
establishing a principal home elsewhere.272 Even though they sold their
Alaskan home and bought one in Arizona to escape the Alaskan winters,
their absences were not longer than proscribed, and the ALJ found them
eligible for their 2011 PFDs, relying in part on the fact that they had always
received one.273
265

Id. at 1–2. The ALJ notes: “climatic change was at least a partial element in the need to move to
San Diego, but the change was not a change from Alaska, where the air can be quite dry, particularly in
the winter, but rather a change from the climate of Seattle.” Id. at 2. This non sequitur makes sense only
in light of the PFDD’s penchant for seizing on lone regulations or statutes while attempting to disprove
an applicant’s eligibility. In this case, ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(5) (2014) proscribes absences from
Alaska for climatic change in the context of PFD eligibility.
266
J.H. and S. & N.J., OAH No. 09-0399-PFD at 3.
267
Id. at 4–5. Ruling with the spirit and not the letter of the law, the ALJ rejected the PFDD’s
argument, characterizing it as an out-of-context consideration of small actions that alone might
demonstrate a lack of Alaskan residency even though “the body of evidence as a whole shows that the
person has maintained the intent to return to Alaska to remain indefinitely and make a home.” Id. at 4.
268
L and S M, OAH No. 11-0416-PFD 1, 2, 5 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Mar. 6, 2012).
269
Id. at 1–2.
270
Id. at 1–4.
271
Id. at 1.
272
Id. at 3–4. However, after downplaying the importance of maintaining a principal home in
Alaska, the ALJ took pains to describe the cabin Mr. and Mrs. M. still owned in Alaska, complete with
“electrical power, running water, hot shower, wood heat stove, propane refrigerator and cook stove, TV
and cell phone service,” which then became Mr. and Mrs. M.’s “principal physical home” after selling
their other house in Alaska. Id. at 2.
273
Id. at 1–2, 5. But see W.J., M.J., and L.J., OAH No. 07-0487-PFD (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Feb.
7, 2008). In that case, despite other decisions that hypothetically downplay the importance of a principal
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In the case of Ms. G., the PFDD denied a 2008 PFD to an applicant
born and raised in Alaska on the grounds that she had severed her Alaska
residency and established a principal home in Washington near the Army
base where her husband was stationed.274 On appeal, the PFDD argued that
because Ms. G.’s husband, a military service member, had not applied for a
PFD, she too was ineligible.275 The ALJ rejected this argument, noting that
Ms. G.’s absence during the qualifying year fell well short of the 180-day
cut-off.276 Furthermore, the ALJ found Ms. G.’s testimony that she planned
to return to Alaska in 2010, once her husband’s commitment to the Army
ended, persuasive – Ms. G. had “maintained family ties sufficiently strong
that she and her children are welcome to move back into her mother-inlaw’s Anchorage home whenever they want.”277 Even though she intended
to stay out of state for twenty months accompanying her husband, who was
ineligible for a 2008 PFD, Ms. G., who was “an Alaska resident and has
been since she was born,” received her 2008 PFD.278
2. Removing the Specter of Alaskan Equity from the Administrative Code
Interestingly, Alaska has one statute279 and three small sections of
administrative code280 that delimit how much weight an ALJ may give to a
PFD applicant’s marriage to a resident or nonresident spouse, but the
provisions appear, if not contradictory, then at least at odds enough to
explain why the ALJs in the previous subsections stressed Alaskan family
ties as a powerful factor favoring PFD eligibility. For instance, by statute
the “residency of an individual’s spouse may not be the principal factor
relied upon by the [PFDD] commissioner in determining the residency of
the individual.”281 However, by administrative code “[t]he fact that an
home in Alaska, one ALJ ruled that when Mr. and Mrs. J., residents of Alaska since 1961, temporarily
moved from an Anchorage trailer park to a trailer on their own property in Texas, intending to return to
Alaska once their health improved, they could not receive PFDs because “the family had no permanent
place of residence in Alaska, and their presence in Texas was not transient.” Id. at 1–2, 4–5.
274
K. G. and her children I. & A. G., OAH No. 09-0257-PFD 1, 1–2 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Oct.
27, 2009).
275
Id. at 3; see ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(a)(3) (2014) (creating an allowable absence for a spouse
accompanying a military service member if that service member is “eligible for a current year
dividend.”).
276
K. G. and her children I. & A. G., OAH No. 09-0257-PFD at 3–4. An applicant may be allowably
absent during the qualifying year for 180 days “for any reason consistent with the individual’s intent to
remain a state resident.” See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(a)(17) (2014).
277
K. G. and her children I. & A. G., OAH No. 09-0257-PFD at 2.
278
Id. at 2–3, 5. Because of her planned prolonged absence through 2008, if Ms. G wished to receive
a 2009 PFD, her husband would need to apply to make her eligible under ALASKA STAT. §
43.23.008(a)(3) (accompanying a military service member); see also K. A. C. and minor child R. A. C.,
OAH No. 09-0367-PFD 1, 1–2, 5–6 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Dec. 4, 2009) (holding that an applicant
born and raised in Alaska who accompanied an ineligible military husband to California but was absent
less than 180 days was eligible for a 2008 PFD even though she incorrectly filled out her application to
indicate that she was maintaining her principal home outside of Alaska during the qualifying year).
279
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.015(a) (2014).
280
See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15 § 23.143(g), (i), (j) (2013).
281
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.015(a) (2014).
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individual’s spouse has not declared Alaska residency does not establish a
presumption that an individual is not a resident.”282 But ALJs have
broadened the term “spouse” to include family and have disregarded the
statute in favor of the code’s bizarre and faulty contrapositive: the fact that
an individual’s spouse or family has declared Alaska residency does
establish a presumption that an individual is a permanent resident and
therefore deserves a PFD.283
To counteract the ALJs reasoning, which swells and then bursts the
plain meaning of the rules of law on which they rely, Alaska should look to
similarly isolated states and territories that have adopted much more
equitable and workable rules for residency. For instance, the Hawaii
residency statute accounts for the gathering influence a family has on where
one resides, but it also unequivocally deals with an individual who has
broken those ties:
If a person resides with the person’s family in one place,
and does business in another, the former is the person’s
place of residence; but any person having a family, who
establishes the person’s dwelling place other than with the
person’s family, with the intention of remaining there shall
be considered a resident where the person has established
such dwelling place.284
The territory of Guam has essentially the same residency statute
with one minor alteration.285 An applicant’s substantial ties to bona fide
permanent Alaska residents should not always weigh in favor of PFD
eligibility – otherwise, a good-old-boys network of us and them, sourdoughs
versus cheechakos, will creep back into Alaskan jurisprudence in
contravention of Zobel’s holding and against the stated purpose of the PFD
program itself: “‘to encourage persons to maintain their residence in Alaska
and to reduce population turnover in the state.’”286 Hawaii’s statute, because
it explicitly addresses familial ties by giving them only modest weight in the
residency inquiry, should be brought into Alaska’s Administrative Code
right after the three provisions on the effects of marrying a nonresident.287
282

ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.143(j) (2013); see also id. § 23.143(g) (stating that “[a]
resident who marries a nonresident while physically present in Alaska is considered to have the intent to
remain indefinitely in Alaska until the resident takes steps or actions to depart Alaska.”); id. § 23.143(i)
(stating that “[t]he eligibility of a resident who marries a nonresident while absent from Alaska is not
changed by the marriage, so long as the resident is absent for the resident’s own allowable reason.”).
283
See, e.g., discussion of administrative hearings supra notes 156–58, 169–73, 186–93, 257–61,
273–78 and accompanying text; see also discussion of administrative hearings infra notes 292–304 and
accompanying text.
284
HAW. REV. STAT. § 11–13 (2008).
285
See 3 GUAM CODE ANN. § 9123(c) (2012).
286
Ross v. State, 292 P.3d 906, 910 (Alaska 2012), superseded by statute, ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008
(2013), (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61 n.7 (1982) (quoting 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 21, §
1(b) (repealed 1982))).
287
This proposed rule change should be placed at ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.143(k) (2012).
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This addition would provide a much-needed counterweight to Alaska’s
permanent residency inquiry by unequivocally stating that family ties only
count so long as they are maintained.
C. Retention of Residency and Intent
Like the military service members discussed above, many Alaskan
civilians venture out of state in the normal course of their lives; sometimes
their absences are allowable for PFD purposes, other times they are not.288
As a general rule of thumb, an absence “for any reason consistent with the
individual’s intent to remain a state resident” does not disqualify an
individual from receiving a dividend so long as the absence does not exceed
180 days, though combining absences can lead to counterintuitive results.289
Because PFD applicants must be state residents,290 the PFDD
sometimes contests the residency of those who have moved out of state and
appear to be laying down roots elsewhere. The PFDD often claims that
those individuals have acted in a manner “inconsistent with an intent to
remain in Alaska indefinitely.”291 However, when the PFDD takes aim at
longtime Alaska residents in this way, the ALJs often rely on past residency
as the best indicator of future intent, thereby pulling longtime residents back
from the brink of ineligibility. While their methodology has a practicality to
it that is easy to administer – and probably a healthy dash of common sense
to boot – the cases in which the ALJ advocates most for a longtime
resident’s PFD leave a faint impression that the applicant’s past
contributions are being rewarded.
1. Selected Administrative Hearings
For instance, consider the case of D.C., who moved to Alaska in
1982 and whose children were born and raised in the state.292 After D.C.
divorced her husband, she took up with Mr. O., who “was born in Alaska
288

See ALASKA STAT. § 42.23.008 (2014) (describing allowable absences and ascribing them
permissible durations, such as 180, 120, or 45 days); see also supra text accompanying notes 39–45
(listing some allowable absences).
289
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(a)(17) (2014); see E. & B.H., OAH No. 08-0706-PFD 1, 3 (Alaska
Dep’t of Revenue April 7, 2009) (explaining the “surprising and counterintuitive” results this provision
may produce: “Under the law, a person could be absent from the state on vacation for 180 days, and the
entire absence would be allowable. A person could be absent from the state for 365 days for medical
reasons, and the absence would be allowable. But a person who takes a 46-day vacation early in the
year, and then suffers an unforeseen accident or illness requiring an absence of more than 135 days later
in the same year would not be eligible [because t]he total absence in that case would be 181 days . . . . A
person who has been absent vacationing for 178 days in one year, as the [applicants] were, can only
afford to be absent from Alaska for two more days for medical or any other reasons but military service
and still be eligible for the following year’s dividend.”).
290
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(a)(3) (2014).
291
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.143(a)(3) (2013); see also ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.055(c)
(2007).
292
D.C., individually and ex rel. W. and W.G., and J.O., OAH No. 07-0653-PFD 1, 1 (Alaska Dep’t
of Revenue Feb. 1, 2008).
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and has lived here all his life.”293 When the couple planned a trip to Oregon
to visit family, they left their belongings with D.C.’s mother, also an Alaska
resident.294 After they arrived in Oregon and visited with their family, the
couple then decided to return to Alaska before the children’s school
commenced, but their van needed mechanical work, so the couple decided to
stay in Oregon long enough to finance their return trip.295 D.C. applied for
food stamps and Mr. O. found construction work.296
When D.C. applied for her PFD, the PFDD denied it on the grounds
that the Oregon sojourn terminated her residency and that she had made
Oregon her principal home.297 The ALJ noted, however, that an extended
vacation, for less than 180 days, was consistent with Alaskan residency.298
Furthermore, “Ms. C. has lived here since 1982, when she was twelve; she
married and raised her two children here, and her mother and sister continue
to live here, as does the children’s’ [sic] father.”299 The ALJ also had to
contend with the PFDD’s claim that Ms. C. severed her Alaskan residency
by establishing or claiming residency in another state when she applied for
food stamps in Oregon.300 Neither the department nor Ms. C. could produce
sufficient evidence on whether obtaining food stamps in Oregon required
claiming Oregon residency, but the ALJ ruled that, even if it did, such a
claim would only establish evidence of a temporary residency.301 By statute,
Ms. C. would have also needed the intent to remain in Oregon to vitiate her
Alaskan residency.302 It is impossible to tell whether the ALJ in fact knew
that applying for food stamps in Oregon required declaring residency in that
state under penalty of federal law,303 but he nonetheless advanced an
interpretation of the regulations favorable to Ms. C., the longtime Alaska

293

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
296
Id.
297
Id. at 2–3.
298
Id. at 3.
299
Id.
300
Id. at 4–5 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.055(c) (2007)); see also ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, §
23.143(d)(17) (2013) (conditioning the receipt of a PFD on not obtaining a benefit “as a result of
establishing or maintaining any claim of residency in another state,” but creating an exception for
Medicaid beneficiaries).
301
D.C., individually and ex rel. W. and W.G., and J.O., OAH No. 07-0653-PFD at 4–5.
302
Id. at 5. The AJL read subsections of the Alaska’s residency statute in pari materia to hold that
the same standard for establishing residency in Alaska applied to establishing residency outside the state.
Id.; compare ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.055(a) (2007) (defining residency as “being physically present in
the state with the intent to remain in the state indefinitely”) with id. § 01.10.055(c) (cutting off the
Alaskan residency of whoever “establishes or claims residency in another state” without defining
residency).
303
Assuming that the Oregon application for food stamps has not changed substantially in the past
eight years, Ms. C. likely signed a form that stated: “By signing below I agree that: I have given DHS
[OHA] true, correct and complete information; I understand that making false statements or hiding
information may mean state and federal penalties, as well as having to repay any overpayment[;] . . . I
declare I am a resident of Oregon.” Application for Services, DHS OREGON DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVICES
1, 12 (Jan. 2014), https://apps.state.or.us/Forms/Served/de0415f.pdf (emphasis added).
294
295
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resident, by reading the statute against its plain meaning.304
In fact, in a later case, receiving the same benefit from the state of
Oregon led to a PFD disqualification.305 In that case, the parents of a young
man who likely impregnated his girlfriend flew the pregnant girlfriend, a
life-long Alaskan, down to Oregon in order to convince their son to take a
paternity test.306 Because the negotiations regarding the paternity test were
lengthy, the young man’s relatives encouraged the girl, Ms. L., to apply for
Oregon public assistance benefits, which she did, filling out a form in which
she declared she was a resident of Oregon.307 Unlike D.C.’s case, the PFDD
here presented evidence that the public assistance form required a claim of
Oregon residency, and the ALJ determined that no dividend should be
rewarded, noting that, although the applicant did not intend to disqualify
herself, the “bright-line rule” embodied by the administrative code left no
room for equitable considerations.308
It is hardly worth debating whether D.C., the stranded mother of
two, or Ms. L., the pregnant girlfriend of a reluctant father, would be the
more sympathetic applicant in the eyes of a judge, but both were long-time
Alaska residents, yet one received a PFD while the other did not under
virtually the same set of facts. The two rulings simply highlight the
equitable leeway these ALJs have in crafting decisions, especially when (as
in the case of D.C.) the PFDD had not done its homework before bringing a
case.309 Had the ALJ in Ms. L.’s case heeded the precedent set forth in
D.C.’s case, Ms. L. would likely have received her dividend.310

304

D.C., individually and ex rel. W. and W.G., and J.O., OAH No. 07-0653-PFD at 5. The ALJ read
the residency statute in the most equitable manner, but it could have, of course, been read differently.
Subsection (c) divests an individual of Alaskan residency if she “establishes or claims residency in
another state . . . or performs other acts or is absent under circumstances that are inconsistent with the
intent required under (a) of this section to remain a resident of this state.” ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.055(c)
(2007) (emphasis added). The required intent is defined in subsection (a) as “the intent to remain in the
state indefinitely and to make a home in the state.” Id. § 01.10.055(a). Because claims residency is
separated from other acts by the disjunctive ‘or’ and a comma, it could be argued that only the term other
acts should be modified by subsection (a), which would require only those other acts to contradict an
“intent to remain in [Alaska] indefinitely,” meaning that a claim of residency in another state requires no
intent to sever Alaskan residency. See id. § 01.10.055(a), (c). Furthermore, subsection (a) refers
exclusively to one who “establishes residency,” whereas subsection (c) refers to one who “establishes or
claims residency.” Id. § 01.10.055(a), (c) (emphasis added). Arriving at the ALJ’s conclusion requires
both treating or claims as surplusage and reading the ‘or’ in subsection (c) as an ‘and.’
305
J.T.L., OAH No. 09-0039-PFD 1, 4 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue April 24, 2009).
306
Id. at 1.
307
Id.; see also supra note 303.
308
Id. at 4 (citing ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.143(d)(17) (2013) (disqualifying an applicant
who has “obtained any other benefit or benefits as a result of establishing or maintaining any claim of
residency in another state or country or by disclaiming Alaska residency . . . .”).
309
D.C., individually and ex rel. W. and W.G., and J.O., OAH No. 07-0653-PFD at 4–5.
310
Id. at 5 (holding that “[m]ore fundamentally, even [if D.]C.’s application included a claim of
Oregon residency for purposes of obtaining food stamps, [D.]C. did not claim permanent residency,
because she retained the intent to return to Alaska and remain there indefinitely: a claim of residency for
purposes of obtaining food stamps would only have been an acknowledgment of temporary residency.”).
But see supra note 308 and accompanying text.
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Other discrepancies exist as well, especially when the cases turn on
something as elusive and insusceptible to concrete proof as an applicant’s
subjective intent to return to Alaska and remain there indefinitely. As the
opinions all recite in one way or another, “[a] resident who leaves the state
remains a resident, but only for so long as he maintains the intent to return
to Alaska to remain indefinitely and to make a home in the state, and only if
the absence is under circumstances that are not inconsistent with this
intent.”311 As may be suspected, long-time residents have a decisive edge
over newcomers when it comes to proving their intent to return, arguably a
sensible and widely-accepted result,312 but one that nonetheless rewards
long-time residents more consistently than other applicants.
For example, consider the case of Ms. C., who had a twenty-year
history in Alaska, but who found herself in financial straits in Seattle,
desiring to return to Alaska.313 The PFDD denied Ms. C. and her children
their 2008 PFDs, reasoning that without any money, Ms. C.’s intent to
return to Alaska and remain there indefinitely was negated.314 The ALJ
disagreed, stating: “[t]he fact that at this point [Ms. C’s family has] pinned
their return to receipt of their dividends does not mean that they lack the
requisite intent to return to Alaska to remain indefinitely and make their
home.”315 In fact, Ms. C had visited relatives in Washington state every
seven years while always returning to Alaska.316 But during this trip, five of
the C. family’s relatives passed away, and the C. family soon exhausted
their resources, forcing Ms. C.’s husband and eldest son to take day-labor
jobs while the younger children attended school in Spokane.317 Still, the
ALJ ruled that their twenty-year-long ties to Alaska were so strong that,
even without PFDs, the C. family would have likely found a way to return to
Alaska, where they had “better prospects for regaining their financial
footing.”318 Their intent to return to the state was credible, so each family
311

E.g., M.D., OAH No. 05-0027-PFD 1, 2 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Aug. 26, 2005).
See, e.g., People v. Mertz, 842 N.E.2d 618, 622, 633, 635 (Ill. 2005) (upholding the death penalty
for a defendant convicted of first degree murder after a former FBI special agent testified that “past
behavior is the best indicator of future behavior.”); In re Goodwin, No. 09-05-534 CV, 2006 Tex. App.
LEXIS 9185, at *7, *13 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2006) (classifying Mr. Goodwin as a sexually violent
predator who must undergo civil commitment after an expert “testified that past behavior is the best
indicator of future behavior”); State v. Clayton, No. 81976, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 3066, at *11 (Ohio
Ct. App. June 26, 2003) (recounting psychologist’s testimony that “past behavior is the best indicator of
future behavior.”).
313
M. C. and her children P., K., S. & H.C. and A.S., OAH No. 09-0425-PFD 1, 1–2 (Alaska Dep’t
of Revenue Dec. 17, 2009).
314
Id. at 3–4.
315
Id. at 4.
316
Id. at 1.
317
Id. at 2.
318
Id. at 4–5. To be fair, this same ALJ, when faced with the application of an Alaskan who played a
part in the establishment of the permanent fund dividend itself but who was unallowably absent from the
state for over 180 days, reasoned as follows:
In the end, the K.s’ case must be decided not by a broad measure of Mr. K.’s extraordinary
ties to Alaska, and indeed his participation in the history of the state, or by a weighing of the
K.s’ love for Alaska, their intent to return to Alaska when they are absent, or their desire to
312
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member received a 2008 PFD.319
The following two administrative hearings highlight the contrast
between how ALJs treat newcomers to the state as opposed to wellestablished residents. Ms. K., who was denied a 2008 PFD, established
Alaska residency for PFD purposes in 2005.320 Ms. K. was only gone
during 2007, the qualifying year, for less than two weeks, but she then lived
in her husband’s house in Arizona until September 2008, at which point she
returned to Alaska and had “remained in the state since then.”321 But, in
response to questions on her PFD application asking whether she intended to
return to Alaska to remain indefinitely, she wrote “no,” and also indicated
she had moved her household goods to Arizona.322 The ALJ took these
responses at face value and denied Ms. K. a 2008 PFD despite precedent
holding that an actual return to the state trumps an earlier shaky intent to do
so323 and despite the widespread practice of reforming these mistakenly
answered questions that ALJs have characterized as confusing.324
By contrast Mr. W., who received his contested 2007 PFD, was a
long-time Alaska resident who purchased a home outside of Fairbanks in
1980.325 Mr. W. was raising two daughters by himself and found it
necessary to take a temporary construction job in San Diego from October
2003 to February 2005.326 When Mr. W.’s eldest daughter decided to move
closer to her father’s Alaska home after she graduated high school, he
resolved to return to Alaska permanently, regardless of the poorer job
continue participating in the affairs of the state. Ultimately, it comes down to a mere
counting of days on a calendar, and a routine and dispassionate application of rules to the
reasons the applicants happened to be absent for certain numbers of days during the
qualifying year.
L. & P. K., OAH No. 09-0067-PFD 1, 1, 3 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Sept. 3, 2009).
319
M. C. and her children P., K., S. & H.C. and A.S., OAH No. 09-0425-PFD at 5. Ms. C and her
five children each received $3,269, meaning that together they received $19,614. See Eric Christopher
Adam, By the numbers: Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend, ALASKADISPATCH (Sept. 18, 2012),
http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/numbers-alaska-permanent-fund-dividend; see also L.M., OAH
No. 10-0065-PFD 1, 1, 3–5 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Apr. 16, 2010) (granting 2009 PFDs to Ms. M., a
long-time Alaska resident and mother of 4, who moved to Idaho to accompany her ineligible military
spouse because her absence was less than 180 days and in part because the family planned to use their
2009 PFDs “to return to Alaska while Mr. M. was overseas.”). But see M.D., OAH No. 05-0027-PFD 1,
1–3 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Aug. 26, 2005) (denying PFD to applicant who spent his last penny to
visit his dying father, who actually recovered to good health, because the applicant “lack[ed] the means
to return to the state and [was] unlikely to be able to afford a return trip any time in the near future.”).
320
C. M. K. and minor child M., OAH No. 09-0418-PFD 1, 1 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Feb. 10,
2010).
321
Id. at 1–2.
322
Id. at 2.
323
Id. at 3; see also M & A.R., OAH No. 06-0228-PFD 1, 3 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Sept. 22,
2006) (stating that “[i]t is plain to see, however, that the R.s have in fact already returned to Alaska to
remain indefinitely and make their home, making conjecture about the likelihood of such a return an
unproductive exercise.”); see also discussion of administrative hearings supra notes 175, 198–203 and
accompanying text.
324
See generally E. M. T., OAH No. 09-0581-PFD (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Feb. 3, 2010).
325
C.W., OAH No. 09-0430-PFD 1, 1 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Dec. 17, 2009).
326
Id.
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prospects.327 He returned in the spring of 2005, but left again for California
later that summer to gather his belongings, returning in the spring of 2006,
the qualifying year, though he left again briefly at the end of that year to
drive his truck from San Diego to his parents’ home in Seattle.328 Although
the PFDD contended that Mr. W.’s residency was in limbo throughout 2006,
and that he had not done enough to establish himself as an Alaskan resident
for PFD purposes, the ALJ ruled that Mr. W. had re-established his Alaskan
residency back in 2005, stating: “in light of the fact that he owned a home in
Alaska at all times that he kept partially vacant for his eventual return to the
state, Mr. W. needed to do less than most people to quickly reestablish
himself as an Alaskan.”329 Ms. K., like Mr. W., also moved back to Alaska
by the time of the hearing,330 making it difficult to escape the conclusion
that the difference between the two outcomes boils down to Mr. W.’s long
history within the state compared to Ms. K.’s status as a newcomer.331
2. Eligibility should require an Actual Return to Alaska –
the Super-Dividend
As the allowable absences statute provides, one may be away from
Alaska more often than not while receiving an education, serving the armed
forces, receiving continuous medical treatment, looking after a terminally
ill, out of state family member, or serving as a member of Congress.332 Each
of these absences allows an Alaska resident to spend the bulk of her time
outside of the state while still receiving an annual PFD so long as she
intends to return to Alaska to remain indefinitely and so long as she does not
evince a similar intent with respect to another state.333 The PFDs will
continue to roll in until the fifth year of the resident’s absence, at which
point she faces the thirty-days-in-five-years presumption detailed above.334
So long as she overcomes this presumption,335 she may continue to receive
PFDs, perhaps indefinitely, while remaining allowably absent outside of
Alaska, subject only to the discretion of the PFDD or an ALJ.336 The ten327
328
329
330

2010).

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3–4.
C. M. K. and minor child M., OAH No. 09-0418-PFD 1, 2 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Feb. 10,

331
Not all newcomers encounter such a straightforward application of the law. For instance, Ms. B,
who arrived in Alaska in 2001, was awarded a 2004 PFD even though she left the state to accompany her
husband to a military base overseas only three months after filing her application. J.B., OAH No. 050318-PFD 1, 1 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Nov. 28, 2005). Although her decision to join her husband so
soon after filing made for “a suspicious set of circumstances,” the ALJ was persuaded by a letter from
Ms. B’s employer testifying to her resolve to remain in Alaska indefinitely at the time she filed her
application. Id. at 3.
332
ALASKA STAT. § 42.23.008(a) (2014).
333
See id.; ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.143 (2013).
334
See supra Section III.A.
335
See ALASKA STAT. §43.23.008(d)-(e) (2014).
336
Id. (failing to establish a limit for applicants who have overcome the thirty-days-in-five-years
presumption).
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year final limit, which required an applicant to have been absent from
Alaska for 180 days or fewer during her eleventh qualifying year to receive
her PFD, has been repealed.337
Allowing Alaska residents to collect dividends while absent seems
to utterly contradict one of the core governmental objectives around which
the whole dividend program was constructed: “to encourage people to stay
in Alaska.”338 If this is the benchmark by which to measure the success of
the PFD program, then it is safe to say that, either Alaska’s unique location
and economy make it impossible to foster a stable resident population, or
else the PFD program has failed miserably. “Alaska has one of the highest
rates of population turnover in the nation – there are always large numbers
of people moving in and out, regardless of whether the overall population is
growing or shrinking.”339 In fact, the only states with a smaller percentage
of citizens born in state are Arizona, Florida, and Nevada.340
Because a stable, permanent population in turn leads to the retention
of Alaskan wealth within Alaska’s communities,341 it makes little sense to
reward long-absent Alaska residents with a PFD meant to entice them to
remain in Alaska. Instead, a resident allowably absent from the state for
more than a year should have her PFDs held in a PFDD-administered
escrow fund. Once she returns from out of state and re-establishes
eligibility under the same processes with which any newcomer to the state
must comply,342 including at least six months spent in Alaska,343 she would
then be entitled to a super-dividend comprised of her prior years’ PFDs. A
resident’s ten-year absence from the state, like the bar that once existed
337

ALASKA STAT. § 42.23.008(c) (2007), repealed by H.B. 52, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2013).
Ross v. State, 292 P.3d 906, 911 (Alaska 2012), superseded by statute, ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008
(2013).
339
Eddie Hunsinger et al., Alaska’s Highly Migratory Population: Annual move to, from, and across
the state, ALASKA ECON. TRENDS 1, 4 (Apr. 2012), http://laborstats.alaska.gov/trends/apr12art1.pdf.
340
Id. at 8.
341
See supra text accompanying note 120. One Alaskan economist classifies “tourism . . . seafood,
mining, petroleum, and timber” as Alaska’s “‘enclave’ industries,” meaning that “a significant share of
the workforce consists of nonresidents” and that the industry operates in a rural area, oftentimes
seasonally. Scott Goldsmith, Structural Analysis of the Alaska Economy: What are the Drivers? 1, 67
(Oct. 2008), http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/structureAKeconomy.pdf. As a result, “[m]ost
of the inputs required by these businesses are not purchased locally within Alaska but rather imported
directly and bypass the local economies within which they seasonally operate.” Id. People who come to
Alaska to work and then leave “spend only a part of their earnings within the state economy and, thus,
make a limited contribution to the overall size of the economy.” Id. at 123–24. As an example,
nonresident oil workers are “concentrated in camps on the North Slope to which [they] commute . . .
from outside the state.” Id. at 25. Therefore, isolated as they are, the money they make “does not
contribute significantly to the Alaska economy.” Id. But see Residency of Alaska Workers: 2012,
ALASKA
DEP’T
OF
LABOR
&
WORKFORCE
DEV.
1,
25
(Jan.
2014),
http://laborstats.alaska.gov/reshire/nonres.pdf (stating that “[n]early 419,000 people worked in Alaska at
some point in 2012, and about one-fifth of them weren’t residents. The nonresident workforce has a
significant effect on Alaska’s economy, but determining whether it’s negative or positive is a
complicated economic question the available data can’t answer.”).
342
See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005 (2014); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.143 (2013); Heller v.
Dep’t of Revenue, 314 P.3d 69, 74–75 (Alaska 2013); see also supra Section II.B.
343
ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(b) (2014); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15 § 23.143(c) (2013).
338
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under Alaska Statute section 43.23.008(c) (2007),344 would cut off her
ability to recover withheld dividends, which would then revert back into the
general PFD fund. The super-dividend would work in tandem with the
modified thirty-days-in-five-years presumption set forth above: eligibility is
preserved only if the applicant has returned to the state for at least thirty
days during her five-year absence unless unavoidable circumstances are
shown.345 However, for purposes of the super-dividend, the tricky issues of
whether the applicant intended to return to Alaska would not factor into the
analysis until the applicant actually does or does not return to Alaska, as the
case may be, thereby proving or disproving her erstwhile subjective intent to
do so.346
Precedent from administrative hearings already supports the idea
that actually returning to Alaska nips an argument of ineligibility in the bud.
For instance, Mr. T. was awarded a PFD because “Mr. T. did move back to
Alaska in 2004. This is strong evidence, of his intent to return during his
absence.”347 However, is it correct to assert that an action which occurred
post-application can be evidence of an applicant’s state of mind as of the
time he filed for his PFD? It would be more proper to say that the future
action confirmed the applicant’s prior intent, yet ALJs have no framework
through which to analyze an actual return to Alaska and must instead cram
such evidence awkwardly into the catch-all provision, “any other factors
demonstrating the individual's intent.”348 Contemplating this dilemma, one
ALJ creatively employed a meteorological metaphor:
It is plain to see, however, that the R.s have in fact already
returned to Alaska to remain indefinitely and make their
home, making conjecture about the likelihood of such a
return an unproductive exercise. The rule incorrectly
projects the unlikelihood of an occurrence that has already
occurred. The result is akin to using the best available
scientific methods to predict rain for yesterday, when
everybody remembers a clear sunny day.349
A super-dividend escrow fund would eliminate the need for ALJs to
divine something as nebulous and corrigible as an individual’s intent to
344

ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(c) (2007), repealed by H.B. 52, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2013).
See supra Section III.A.1.
346
See Heller v. Dep’t of Revenue, 314 P.3d 69, 79 n.41 (Alaska 2013) (recognizing that “an
applicant’s intent to return can be accurately assessed only in hindsight in many cases.”).
347
R.T. and his child C.T., OAH No. 05-0409-PFD 1, 3 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Nov. 18, 2005);
see also supra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.
348
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.163(g)(7) (2010) (ending the list of factors to be considered
when rebutting the thirty-days-in-five-years presumption).
349
See M & A.R., OAH No. 06-0228-PFD 1, 3–4 (Alaska Dep’t of Revenue Aug. 25, 2006) (holding
the thirty-days-in-five-years presumption rebutted even though the seven factors pointed toward
ineligibility because of the applicant’s actual return to Alaska); see also discussion of this administrative
hearing supra notes 196–201.
345
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return to Alaska and remain indefinitely. No longer would ALJs weigh past
ties to Alaska to determine the probability of an applicant returning to
Alaska; rather, they would apply the same test to all Alaskans – one’s equity
as a long-time Alaskan would all but drop out of the analysis. Soldiers and
students would bear the brunt of this proposed rule change; however, in
deciding whether to return to Alaska, the super-dividend, which could
combine ten dividends for an approximate total of $15,000 per applicant,350
would provide a huge incentive: soldiers would have start-up money to
finance the acquisition of an Alaskan home, and students would have cash
on hand to offset the cost of educational loans. Many bright, young
Alaskans who pursued out of state educations would think twice before
passing up the super-dividend to start a career elsewhere.
But the super-dividend escrow account would not be without
problems. Alaskans would invariably argue – just as the Zobels did over
three decades ago – that the super-dividend unconstitutionally creates two
classes of Alaska residents, those within the state who, more often than not,
receive annual PFDs and those outside of it who do not, in contravention of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.351 Absentee
Alaskans may also argue that their constitutionally recognized right to travel
has been violated.352 However, the current PFD system, continually upheld
by the Alaska Supreme Court,353 already creates two classes of Alaska
residents: the eligible permanent residents and the ineligible and, for want of
a better term, nonpermanent residents. The super-dividend would merely
make this distinction more congruous with one of the legitimate state
interests purportedly furthered by the PFD program: stemming population
turnover.354
The well-established constitutional analysis articulated by the
Alaska Supreme Court when faced with an equal protection claim that a
PFD was unlawfully withheld proceeds as follows: (1) “A dividend is
merely an economic interest and therefore is entitled only to minimum
protection under our equal protection analysis;”355 (2) “Equal protection
claims concerning their denial are reviewed under minimum scrutiny;”356 (3)
350

See PFD PAYMENT SUMMARY, supra note 157 (showing PFDs as low as $331.29 in 1984 and as
high as $2,069 in 2008).
351
See discussion supra Section II.B.
352
Such claims have been unanimously denied by Alaska courts, which have found that under the
right to travel analysis, “the State’s purpose in awarding PFDs only to permanent residents outweighs the
minor infringement on the [challenger’s] choice of seasonal residences.” Brodigan v. Alaska Dep’t of
Revenue, 900 P.2d 728, 734 n.13 (Alaska 1995). Furthermore, “[e]ligibility for PFDs includes meeting a
definition of residency tied to physical contact to the state, which may be more difficult to meet than the
definition of residency for other purposes.” Id. at 733 n.12.
353
See discussion supra Section II.D.
354
Ross v. State, 292 P.3d 906, 910 (Alaska 2012), superseded by statute, ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008
(2013).
355
State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 158 (Alaska 1991).
356
Church v. Dep’t of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Alaska 1999).
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“Our review is therefore limited to considering whether this regulation was
designed to achieve a legitimate governmental objective and whether it
bears a fair and substantial relationship to accomplishing that objective;”357
and (4) The super-dividend escrow account “bears a fair and substantial
relationship to the goal[] of limiting the dividend to permanent Alaska
residents.”358 The link between the third and fourth step would note that
stemming population turnover is a legitimate state objective, which is then
subsumed, like the other legitimate state objectives, into the larger rubric of
limiting the dividend to permanent Alaska residents, an oft-cited rationale
for the PFD program.359
It may also be argued that the super-dividend would encourage
fraud. Long-absent Alaskans, seeking a windfall, might return to the state
just long enough to establish eligibility, claim the super-dividend, and then
move back to their out of state residences. It would be hard to fashion a rule
to guard against this scenario without running up against more constitutional
problems. Perhaps those eligible for super-dividends could be required to
re-establish residency in Alaska for two years before receiving their
dividends, but courts may find that this restriction does not rationally relate
to the state’s objective of thwarting fraud. Alternatively, the PFDD could
condition the super-dividend on the recipient’s promise to remain PFDeligible for a certain period of time, but this provision too might prove
unworkable. The super-dividend could also be made to augment each
successive PFD to which the applicant is entitled, with the proviso that, so
long as the applicant remains in the state for three or four or five years
before leaving, the whole super-dividend will be disbursed. But this
solution may impose a costly administrative burden on the PFDD.
In the end, Alaskans may just have to trust that their fellow
Alaskans who seek super-dividends will have good intentions while
realizing that the current penalty for PFD fraud – the defrauder “may have to
repay all the Permanent Fund Dividends ever received, and forfeit the right

357
Harrod v. State, 255 P.3d 991, 1001 (Alaska 2011) (stating that “[w]e have reviewed and upheld
the purpose and means served by PFD eligibility schemes in numerous cases.”).
358
Ross, 292 P.3d at 913, superseded by statute, ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008 (2013).
359
See, e.g., Church, 973 P.2d at 1130 (noting that “[t]he objective of the challenged statutes and
regulations is to ensure that only permanent residents receive dividends.”); Brodigan v. Alaska Dep’t of
Revenue, 900 P.2d 728, 732 (Alaska 1995) (stating that “the Department must be able to reasonably
define statutory terms to insure that the permanent fund is protected for the legitimate claims of
permanent residents.”); Dep’t of Revenue, Permanent Fund Dividend Div. v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 628
(Alaska 1993) (noting that “permanent fund dividends should encourage persons to maintain their
residence in Alaska and to reduce population turnover . . . . To this end, the legislature has specifically
limited dividend eligibility to permanent residents of the state.”) (internal quotation marks deleted); see
also McGreal, supra note 79, at 274 (describing the Alaska Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis as
“incomplete, conclusory, or contradictory” and reasoning that it may serve only as a guise under which
the court “register[s] its agreement or disagreement with particular statutes.”). The court clearly agrees
with the PFD statutes.
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to all future dividends” – already serves as a powerful deterrent.360
Evidence that an applicant, before applying for a super-dividend, intended to
leave the state permanently upon receiving the super-dividend would
establish fraud.
Although this Comment advocates that a more compelling state
interest for the PFD scheme be articulated because the ones the state now
recites barely relate to the classifications it makes, it is nonetheless well
within the bounds of Alaska Supreme Court precedent to surmise that the
proposed super-dividend escrow account would withstand an equal
protection challenge.361
IV. PROPOSING A NEW LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST
FOR THE PFD PROGRAM
Much of the confusion in the law of PFD eligibility can be traced to
the goals that the PFD program purports to serve – (1) equitably distributing
the state’s wealth to Alaskans, (2) stemming population turnover by
encouraging people to stay in Alaska, and (3) furthering democratic
involvement in the fund – all of which were also goals sought to be
furthered by the original and unconstitutional PFD scheme.362 But do these
goals logically explain the workings of the PFD program in a clear and
satisfactory manner?
Put yourself in the shoes of someone like Mr. and Mrs. Brodigan,
who moved to Alaska in 1962, but were denied their 1990 PFDs because
they traveled to the lower forty-eight on doctor’s orders to take in the
warmer, more therapeutic climate.363 You apply for your dividend, note on
the form that your absence was for a legitimate medical purpose, and then
find out that your application has been denied. The PFDD commissioner
offers to explain the reason for your denial in terms of the goals of the PFD
program. He tells you that Alaska’s vast oil wealth must be equitably
distributed to Alaskans and that, at least this year, you were not Alaskan
enough to qualify. You become angry and perhaps threaten to bring suit –

360
Fraud, STATE OF ALASKA, DEP’T OF REVENUE, PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND DIV.,
http://www.pfd.state.ak.us/Fraud/index (last visited Nov. 26, 2014); see also ALASKA STAT. §
43.23.035(a) (2007).
361
At least according to Alaska courts, any challenge that cannot survive its equal protection analysis
would necessarily break apart against a federal constitutional challenge. Malabed v. N. Slope Borough,
70 P.3d 416, 420 (Alaska 2003) (noting that “[w]e have long recognized that the Alaska Constitution’s
equal protection clause affords greater protection to individual rights than the United States
Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.”).
362
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61 & n.7 (1982) (citing 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 21, § 1(b)
(repealed 1982)).
363
See Brodigan v. Alaska Dep't of Revenue, 900 P.2d 728, 729, 735 (Alaska 1995); see also
discussion of this case supra Section II.D.2.
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after all, you have been in Alaska since before Sarah Palin was born:364
equity demands you be paid a dividend. The commissioner then tells you
that the PFD program works to stem the state’s population turnover; you
remember reading somewhere that Alaska’s population turnover is one of
the highest in the nation365 and become annoyed. Then the commissioner
tells you that the PFD program is meant to encourage Alaskans to become
more involved in its management. You look at him blankly and think that
the only time citizens become involved is when the legislature threatens to
use PFD funds for anything other than a cash handout.366 Would it not make
more sense to justify the PFD program on the equal protection grounds that
it makes eligibility determinations in order to retain Alaskan wealth within
the local economies of Alaska?
An average Alaskan – even a long-time resident like Mr. Brodigan –
may have found the denial of a PFD easier to comprehend when framed in
terms of Alaska’s economy. Many of the suits contesting the denial of a
PFD are not about the money – after all, PFDs average only about $1,100367
– but rather, because the PFD has become a proxy for political belonging,
these suits grow out of a sense of indignation at not being adjudged Alaskan
enough. The next time a PFD case makes it into Alaska’s court system, the
Department of Revenue should articulate an additional goal for the PFD
program – to keep Alaskan money in Alaska – and thereby better align
eligibility classifications with the practical effects of the program itself. By
allowing the nexus between the program’s goals and its implementation to
turn on money rather than on a person’s actions, the PFDD would make it
easier for Alaskans to understand why they were denied a dividend without
riling their sense of state identity.
A. The Current Legitimate State Interests served by the PFD program
The first interest that the PFD program purports to serve merely
provides a convenient cover under which courts judging the program’s
constitutionality are free to employ circular logic. This purpose is: “‘to
provide a mechanism for equitable distribution to the people of Alaska of at
least a portion of the state’s energy wealth derived from the development
and production of the natural resources belonging to them as Alaskans.’”368
364
See Sarah Palin’s Biography, PROJECT VOTE SMART, http://votesmart.org/candidate/biography/
27200/sarah-palin (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (noting that Alaska’s former governor and one-time vice
presidential nominee was born in 1964).
365
See Hunsinger, supra note 335, at 4.
366
Associated Press, War of words heats up between Alaska Dems, GOP as election nears,
FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER (Oct. 30, 2012, 5:40 PM), http://www.newsminer.com/article_
54b9dbee-f5b8-5149-a54a-1b410bb0d3b5.html (stating that “‘I don't know what he meant, but if I was a
normal person listening to that (news conference), I’d say, ‘Sounds like to me he wants to spend my
permanent fund,’ . . . .’”).
367
See PFD PAYMENT SUMMARY, supra note 157.
368
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61 n.7 (1982) (quoting 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 21, § 1(b)
(repealed 1982)).
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This purpose makes it clear that any legislative attempt to give all the state’s
oil wealth to its citizens would not rationally relate back to this purpose –
neither would doling out some of the state’s wealth to Texans. This much is
clear, but the stated purpose simply begs the question of who the people of
Alaska are, which has allowed the legislature to create the concept of the
permanent resident, someone who may receive PFDs yet who is distinct
from an Alaska resident who may or may not receive a PFD but can, for
instance, cast a vote in Alaska or enjoy the other incidences of state
citizenship.369 This purpose stood behind the first unconstitutional PFD
program, which disproportionately rewarded long-time Alaskans, just as it
stands behind the current program.370 The way this purpose is phrased has
lulled Alaska courts into accepting whatever result the program achieves as
necessarily synonymous with its purpose: “any law can be defined as
intended to accomplish what it actually accomplishes.”371 The courts and
the legislature have failed to satisfactorily answer the relevant equal
protection question: “why one group has a greater equitable claim over
another.”372 To answer this question some entity – a court, the legislature,
the PFDD – needs to articulate a rational state interest at work in allocating
PFDs to certain Alaska residents but not others. And a legitimate state
interest cannot discriminate, no matter how convolutedly it may do so
through interlocking and successive statutory and administrative reiterations
of the same self-favoring sentiment that so offended the Zobel Court.373
The second legitimate state interest that the PFDD asserts its
eligibility scheme furthers is the prevention of population turnover in order
to cultivate a stable Alaskan citizenry. However, there is a fundamental
tension between this stated objective and the constitutional right to travel.
In theory, the Alaska Supreme Court recognizes that the right to travel
merits heightened scrutiny in an equal protection analysis,374 but in practice,
owing to Alaska’s unique sliding scale approach to equal protection,375 the
369

See infra note 383.
See Ross v. State, 292 P.3d 906, 910 (Alaska 2012), superseded by statute, ALASKA STAT. §
43.23.008 (2013), (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. at 61 n.7 (quoting 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch.
21, § 1(b) (repealed 1982))) (listing PFD’s purposes); Church v. Dep’t of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1125, 1130
(Alaska 1999) (citing Dep’t of Revenue, Permanent Fund Dividend Div. v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 627
(Alaska 1993)) (listing same purposes).
371
McGreal, supra note 79, at 244–45.
372
Id. at 244.
373
See supra discussion at Section II.A; see also discussion of Mr. Paschall’s testimony, supra
Section III.A.2.
374
State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Alaska 1983) (noting that “[a]s legislation burdens more
fundamental rights, such as rights to speak and travel freely, it is subjected to more rigorous scrutiny at a
more elevated position on our sliding scale.”).
375
See Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1980) (holding that “[W]e will no longer regard
all durational residency requirements as automatically triggering strict scrutiny and requiring a showing
that such a classification is absolutely necessary to promote a compelling state interest. Instead, we will
balance the nature and extent of the infringement on [the right to travel] caused by the classification
against the state’s purpose in enacting the statute and the fairness and substantiality of the relationship
between that purpose and the classification.”), rev’d 457 U.S. 55 (1982); see also supra note 79.
370
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right to travel in the context of PFD eligibility has always been treated under
minimal scrutiny.376 Even though ample precedent supports the proposition
that the right to travel is not violated by the PFD’s eligibility
requirements,377 it makes little sense to continue framing one of the PFD
program’s main goals in direct opposition to the right to travel, thereby
leaving it all the more open to constitutional challenges.
Finally, the third purported state interest served by the PFD program
– “‘to encourage increased awareness and involvement by the residents of
the state in the management and expenditure of the Alaska permanent
fund’”378 – has only been discussed at length in one Alaska case.379 The
Cosio Court reasoned that “[t]he dividend program was intended to create a
constituency in the voting public which would favor reinvestment of
permanent fund earnings rather than using such earnings to finance new
government programs or to defray the expenses of existing ones.”380 It was
imagined that such a constituency would always favor a direct disbursement
of dividend funds rather than allowing PFDs to subsidize the operation of
the state government.381 However, simply giving certain residents a sum of
money each year does not mean that those residents will then always vote to
continue receiving PFDs. Some of the constituency may instead vote to use
the PFD monies to fund a proposed state-wide early education initiative, for
instance – yet other voters might see fit to change the dividend payout
formula so that more money remains available in the future when oil
reserves begin to dwindle.382 If this is the program’s purpose, then it is
over-inclusive in that it assumes all PFD-eligible voters want to continue
receiving PFDs rather than spending or saving the money. The current PFD
program, if meant to implement this third state interest, is also underinclusive: even Alaskans who are ineligible to receive dividends may cast a
vote that bears on the future of the PFD program.383
376

See Heller v. Dep’t of Revenue, 314 P.3d 69, 83 (Alaska 2013).
See Schikora v. State, 7 P.3d 938, 945 (Alaska 2000) (citing Church v. Dep’t of Revenue, 973
P.2d 1125, 1130 (Alaska 1999) (stating that “Schikora's claims that the PFD eligibility regulations
‘prohibit’ or ‘have a chilling effect’ on interstate travel are entirely conclusory and unsubstantiated in the
record. In contrast, the benefits of accurately distributing PFDs to bona fide residents are obvious and
are supported by precedent.”).
378
Ross v. State, 292 P.3d 906, 910 (Alaska 2012) (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61 n.7
(1982) (quoting 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 21, § 1(b) (repealed 1982)).
379
See Dep’t of Revenue, Permanent Fund Dividend Div. v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 628–29 (Alaska
1993).
380
Id. at 628 (citing Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 462 (Alaska 1980), rev’d 457 U.S. 55 (1982)).
381
Id.
382
See generally Scott Goldsmith, Maximum Sustainable Yield: FY 2015 Update, INSTITUTE OF
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE1, 9 & n.vii (Jan. 2014),
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/webnote/2014_01-WebNote16MaximumSustainableYield.pdf.
383
Compare ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.010 (2007) (stating that “[a] person may vote at any election
who . . . has been a resident of the state and of the house district in which the person seeks to vote for at
least 30 days just before the election.”) with ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15 § 23.143(c) (2013) (stating
that “[t]he department will not consider external indicators . . . [such as voter registration, proof of home
377
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Although the current PFD program has never been struck down
when faced with an equal protection challenge, or, for that matter, any
number of constitutional challenges,384 that does not necessarily mean that
the legitimate state interests behind the PFD program have a fair and
substantial relation to the eligibility classifications it implements. The
program may be enshrined in protectionist precedent simply because of its
popularity.385 For the sake of the constitutionality of its future, a new
legitimate state interest that more accurately represents the actual effects of
the program should be announced, namely: the furtherance of Alaska’s
economic health for the general welfare of all Alaskans.
B. The In-state Economy as a Legitimate State Interest
Numerous other jurisdictions, state and federal, allow a state’s
interest in the regulation of its own economic affairs to become a legitimate
state interest under minimal equal protection scrutiny. This Section will
detail those rulings in the hopes of illustrating how Alaska could better
represent its PFD program. But first off, Alaska has already recognized this
type of economic protectionism as a legitimate state interest.386 In Gallant,
a state worker who retired in Hawaii, and therefore was no longer eligible
for the increased “cost-of-living allowance” paid to state retirees who
remain in Alaska (a ten percent increase), brought an equal protection
challenge against the state’s retirement system.387 The Alaska Supreme
Court, overturning the lower court, found that the legislature acted rationally
in desiring “retired public employees to remain in the state” – the court
noted that these retirees:
[M]ake minimal demands on such big ticket government
items as public education and law enforcement, they have
ownership, and the like] established less than six months before December 31 of the qualifying year as
evidence of the establishment of Alaska residency in time to qualify for the current year dividend.”)
(emphasis added) and ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.008(b) (2014) (noting that “[a]n individual may not claim .
. . [certain] allowable absence[s] . . . unless the individual was a resident of the state for at least six
consecutive months immediately before leaving the state.”). See also Heller v. Dep’t of Revenue, 314
P.3d 69, 87-88 (Alaska 2013) (Winfree, J., dissenting) (arguing that hinging the availability of allowable
absences on a six month residency requirement “treats new residents – those who have been Alaska
residents for less than six months – differently from established residents” and therefore violates the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution).
384
See supra Section II.D.
385
See Scott Goldsmith, The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend: A Case Study in Implementation of a
Basic Income Guarantee 1, 6 (July 2010), http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/bien_
xiii_ak_pfd_lessons.pdf. “The annual distribution soon became the most popular program of state
government. Although the Permanent Fund balance, which ultimately determines the size of the PFD, is
constitutionally protected, there is no such guarantee for the annual distribution. The legislature has the
authority to change the formula at any time and could, by law, eliminate it entirely. Its only guarantee is
its political popularity. No legislator would suggest a change in the formula that would reduce its
amount or the share of Permanent Fund earnings allocated to the dividend for fear of losing the next and
all subsequent elections.” Id.
386
See Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Gallant, 153 P.3d 346, 348, 354–55 (Alaska 2007).
387
Id. at 348.
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generally comprehensive health insurance, and they often
positively contribute to society by volunteering in charitable
and civic endeavors. Further, retirees contribute to the
economy when they remain in the state, spending the money
that they have earned during their working lives.388
Other courts have come to similar conclusions under widely
divergent sets of facts. For instance, in an Ohio case, three corporations
protested a statute that created a “joint economic development district”
(“JEDD”) and that required them to pay a special income tax to offset the
JEDD’s operation.389 The corporations brought suit against the City of
Akron for its role in collecting the special income tax, arguing that the tax
violated state and federal guarantees of equal protection.390 The Court
looked to the purpose of the JEDD statute – “to facilitate economic
development to create or preserve jobs and employment opportunities, and
to improve the economic welfare of the people in the state” – and found it to
be a legitimate “goal with which any governmental entity should be
concerned.”391
In a Wyoming case, a tractor-trailer driver brought suit in
negligence against the state highway department after it failed to repaint the
white stripe demarcating the shoulder on a recently resurfaced highway, an
omission which allegedly caused the driver to leave the road and jackknife
his trailer.392 The lower court found that the claim was barred by
Wyoming’s sovereign immunity statute, but the truck driver appealed,
arguing he was denied the equal protection afforded under Wyoming’s
constitution which, among other guarantees, states that “‘[n]o law shall be
enacted limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the
injury or death of any person.’”393 The Court reasoned that no fundamental
right or suspect classification was at issue and therefore applied minimal
scrutiny, under which the questioned statute “need only bear a reasonable
relation to the legislature's legitimate interest in preserving the economic
and social stability of the state.”394 The Court found no equal protection
388

Id. at 352–53 (emphasis added).
Desenco, Inc. v. City of Akron, 706 N.E.2d 323, 536–37 (1999).
390
Id. at 543–44. The corporations argued that the JEDD tax unconstitutionally distinguished
between those in the township who had voted for the creation of the JEDD and those in the township (the
corporations) who generated the revenue susceptible to the new tax without having voted to create the
JEDD. Id. at 544. The court was quick to point out that the claim had no merit: corporations cannot vote.
Id.
391
Id.; see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 6, 12 (1992) (holding that a property owner who
protested California’s property tax assessment system because it capped rates for tenured homeowners
while using recent appraisals to calculate rates for new home purchasers was not denied equal protection
because “the State has a legitimate interest in local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and
stability.”).
392
White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1314 (Wyo. 1989).
393
Id. at 1314, 1317–18 (quoting WYO. CONST. art. 10, § 4).
394
Id. at 1316 (emphasis added).
389
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violation because the state legislature acted reasonably in passing the
sovereign immunity statute by weighing the toll of such litigation against
other pressing governmental concerns.395
Consider a New York case that upheld a statute, which drew
distinctions based on one’s state of residence for purposes of employment as
a New York City firefighter.396 Initially, residency requirements for that job
mandated that the firefighter live in the borough he served, though the
legislature added an exception so that a firefighter could reside within the
city itself or any of its six outlying counties while remaining eligible for
employment.397 As it became apparent that the residency laws were
routinely flaunted, the legislature enacted stricter standards; however, these
standards proved too draconian, and the waiver at issue in this case was
enacted, which the court explained as follows: “Violators of the residency
requirements . . . are permitted to retain their current residences indefinitely
if, and only if, they reside in this State. Similarly situated violators of the
same statutes who live outside the State are required to leave their homes
within one year or else lose their jobs.”398
Against the out of state firefighters’ equal protection challenge, the
court applied a rational basis test because public employment was not a
fundamental right.399 Using this test, the court found that deterring
absenteeism or tardiness could not be a legitimate state interest: many New
Jersey firefighters were closer to their place of work than the New York
firefighters;400 nor could a state interest seeking to foster a sense of
community be put forth since the in-state firefighters did not necessarily
have to live in the borough they served.401 However, the court did find an
“obvious financial” state interest in requiring that New York City
firefighters be state residents:
Public employees who reside in New York are more likely,
as a class, to spend their money in New York. Further,
public employees who reside in New York are more likely
to own real estate here, and so pay property taxes, as well as
resident State income tax. For these financial reasons alone,
New York may doubtless seek to encourage its employees .
. . to reside within the State . . . . Economic self-interest,
395
Id. at 1322; see also Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004) (allowing a state to
grant “special benefits to an intrastate industry” and stating that, “absent a violation of a specific
constitutional provision or other federal law, intrastate economic protectionism constitutes a legitimate
state interest.”).
396
Winkler v. Spinnato, 134 A.D.2d 66, 67–68 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987), aff’d, 72 N.Y.2d 402 (1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005 (1989).
397
Id. at 70.
398
Id. at 72.
399
Id. at 73–74.
400
Id. at 75.
401
Id.
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therefore, is a legitimate State interest which serves to
justify the distinction between State residents and out-ofState residents.402
Although the factual circumstances in the above cases vary, it is
clear that Alaska could constitutionally articulate a new legitimate state
interest – preserving and promoting its own economy – as one of the PFD
program’s legitimate interests to which its eligibility classifications bear a
fair and rational relationship. Although this step may be unnecessary due to
the near sacrosanct status of the PFD program within Alaskan jurisprudence,
an articulation of this new state interest would help to correct the disjointed
connection between the current legitimate state interests and the laws
defining eligibility. And, as this monetary connection gains recognition,
those deemed ineligible may be better able to cope knowing that their
Alaskan status was not at issue, only their ability to spend their Alaskan
money in Alaska. If nothing else, this new state interest would provide a
foundation on which to construct empirically driven arguments for the PFD
program’s legitimacy, as opposed to the current subjective and conjectural
ones.403
V. CONCLUSION
So why all the excitement over a few incongruous administrative
hearings and some cursory state constitutional law analysis? The PFD only
averages around $1,100 anyway,404 and the oil that keeps the payouts
coming may dry up by the middle of this century.405 It is debatable whether
the current PFD even buys roundtrip airfare from Anchorage to New York
City anymore and perhaps slightly less unremarkable that the current PFD
will almost surely buy a one-way ticket to Alaska from just about anywhere
in the lower forty-eight.406
402
Id. at 75–76 (emphasis added); see also Lartnec Inv. Co. v. Ft. Wayne-Allen Co. Convention &
Tourism Auth., 603 F. Supp. 1210, 1226–27 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (finding that a city and county tourism
authority could grant a subsidy to one developer as opposed to another without violating federal equal
protection rights because “the Authority’s subsidy is rationally related to Indiana’s legitimate interest in
promoting local economic development.”); Honeywell, Inc. v. Minnesota Life & Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n,
110 F.3d 547, 555 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that a state statute designed to limit the coverage of a state
insurance company retroactively to state residents only did not offend due process because “[t]he state
has a legitimate interest in regulating the insurance industry, easing the economic burdens of its own
residents, and ensuring the economic life of an association created by its statute to protect its residents.”)
(emphasis added); Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158, 185 (Wyo. 1992) (holding
that “[i]t is apparent that the state has a valid interest in preserving the safety, health, morals, economic
and social stability and general welfare of its citizens. The statutes involved here are rationally related to
the legitimate state interests and do not deprive appellants of the equal protection of the laws.”).
403
See Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 12.
404
See PFD PAYMENT SUMMARY, supra note 159.
405
See Scott Goldsmith, Maximum Sustainable Yield: FY 2014 Update INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE 1, 6–8 (Jan. 2013),
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/webnote/2013_01_03-WebNote14-FY2014MSYupdate.pdf.
406
See supra discussion notes 313–319 (discussing the eligibility of applicants whose intent to return
to Alaska hinges on paying for a return trip with their PFDs).
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But for Alaskans, the PFD symbolizes much more than its monetary
value alone suggests; receiving a PFD means that you have made it in the
state, that you now belong in a much more important way than you once did,
that the state now values your presence, or it certainly would not make an
investment in the possibility of your indefinite residency. In its current
form, the PFD program is opaque to the point of tedium, biased toward
long-time residents or those with ties to them, and likely survives by its
sheer popularity and a sense that we permanent residents deserve what is
annually given to us. These attributes infuse the PFD program with
emotion. Why else would so many appeal the denial of such a relatively
small sum of money? Recovering a wrongly withheld dividend would
entitle you to barely enough money to cover your attorney fees, if that.407
But being told that you are not what you think you are is not a particularly
pleasant experience. If Alaskans are to make rational decisions about the
PFD program’s future, the histrionics have to be engineered out of the
system. Condition the eligibility of an Alaskan absent for over a year on her
actual return to the state and not on her equity as a long-time Alaska
resident. Tell Alaskans that the reason for this change is to protect the
economic self-interest of the state in which they claim residency.
Implementing more objective criteria for the determination of PFD
eligibility will not only better comport with the current goals of the PFD
program, but will also allow for calmer, cooler decision-making moving
forward.

407

Alaska R. Civ. Proc. 82(b)(1) (establishing the amount of attorney’s fees prevailing party can
recover from the opposing party when the court awards a monetary judgment).
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